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DUAL DISTRIBUTION AND ANTITRUST LAW
Robert Zwirb *
I.

INTRODUCTION

Manufacturers and suppliers have two obvious choices for distributing their goods. They can either vertically integrate and distribute directly to final customers or they can distribute indirectly through
independent distributors.' A third and less obvious choice is for the
manufacturer to distribute both directly and through independent dis* Attorney, Federal Trade Commission. B.A. 1971, University of California, Riverside;
J.D. 1974, University of California, Los Angeles. The views are those of the author and do not
reflect the opinions of other members of the commission or the commission staff. The author
would like to thank Paul Pautler, Malcolm Coate, Mark Fratrik, James Ferguson and Ken
Kelly for helpful comments on previous drafts of this paper.
1. The topic of this Article centers on one specific form of distribution referred to as dual
distribution. It is important, however, to understand other types of distribution and the economic relationships that can form between suppliers and distributors.
Economic activity occurs at different levels or stages of a "chain of distribution" with
manufacturers at one end and consumers at the opposite end of the chain. Although the borders between these levels-or the point where a firm is located on the chain of distributionare not always clear, the level at which economic activity occurs is often used as a reference
point to define legal relationships in antitrust law. For example, horizontal arrangements are
those among firms at the same level of the chain-e.g., different manufacturers-while vertical
arrangements are those among firms operating at different levels of the chain-e.g., a manufacturer and his distributors. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).
Under this reasoning, an agreement between two distributors of a product is horizontal, while
an agreement between a manufacturer and a distributor is vertical. Antitrust law is especially
concerned with horizontal arrangements because firms located on the same market level are
considered to be direct competitors.
Vertical integration occurs when a firm covers more than one stage in the chain of manufacturing and distribution. Complete vertical integration occurs when the entire chain is covered. See, eg., F.
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78 (2d ed. 1980); Adelman, Integrationand Antitrust Policy, 63 HARV. L. REv. 27
(1949). Such integration usually occurs when a firm takes on a function that an independent
firm had previously supplied or performed. Vertical integration can occur either backwarde.g., a distributor takes over the production role--or forward-e.g., a manufacturer takes over
the distribution function. A vertically integrated firm does its own production and distribution. A non-integrated manufacturing firm, however, must hire independent firms, referred to
as "independent distributors," to distribute its product. Dual distribution is a form of partial
vertical integration. It comes into play when a firm performs some of the distribution functions itself, while retaining independent firms to perform the rest.
Some courts view the relationship between supplier and its independent distributors in a
dual distribution arrangement as horizontal since they function at the same market level when
distributing. As we will see infra text accompanying notes 65-106 and 109-23, however, this
view is a formalistic way of perceiving these relationships, which does not always correspond
FORMANCE
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tributors at the same time. This latter choice is really a mixture of the
first two and is referred to as "dual distribution." 2 Despite expressions of
doubt by some courts, vertical integration is generally regarded as a legal
method of distribution, equivalent to an inherent right of the manufacturer.3 As for the employment of independent distributors, if such emto economic realities. These relationships, nevertheless, are legally very significant since antitrust law treats most horizontal arrangements much more harshly than vertical ones.
Throughout this Article "manufacturer" will be used interchangeably with "producer"
and "supplier." "Distributor" will be used interchangeably with "dealer," "reseller" or
"retailer."
2. Numerous efficiency-related reasons why manufacturers might adopt a dual distribution system exist. For example, it might be more efficient for the manufacturer to sell directly
to some, but not all, final customers in order to handle large orders or to service large buyers.
Dual distribution is sometimes motivated by a manufacturer's desire to protect its reputation,
by preventing distributors from engaging in opportunistic behavior. Dual distribution also
permits manufacturers to more easily monitor their distribution systems and to provide competitive stimulus to independent distributors. Critics allege, however, that dual distribution
may be imposed for non-efficiency reasons: to facilitate price squeezes on independent dealers
and to implement price discrimination. See Schwartz & Eisenstadt, Vertical Restraints, U.S.
Dept. of Justice Antitrust Div., Econ. Policy Office Discussion Paper, at 65-71 (Dec. 2, 1982)
for a summary of the economic rationales for dual distribution.
3. In United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 525 (1948), the Supreme Court
stated: "It seems clear to us that vertical integration, as such without more, cannot be held
violative of the Sherman Act." In United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 173-75
(1948) the Court also rejected the Department of Justice's argument that vertical integration
was illegal per se. Recently both the Fifth and Seventh Circuits reaffirmed the legality of
vertical integration. In University Life Ins. Co. of America v. Unimarc Ltd., 699 F.2d 846,
852 (7th Cir. 1983), the court noted: "Firms constantly face 'make-or-buy' decisions-that is,
decisions whether to purchase a good or service in the market or to produce it internally-and
ordinarily the decision, whichever way it goes, raises no antitrust question." In Jack Walters
& Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 710 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018
(1984), Judge Posner commented:
[Vertical integration is not an unlawful or even a suspect category under the antitrust laws .... Vertical integration is a universal feature of economic life and it
would be absurd to make it a suspect category under the antitrust laws just because it
may hurt suppliers of the service that has been brought within the firm.
Besides being legal, Posner also noted that "vertical integration is usually procompetitive." Id.
See also Red Diamond Supply Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001, 1006-07 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied,454 U.S. 827 (1981); Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 624
F.2d 1342, 1351 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1980).
While vertical integration, as a method of distribution,is legal, the process by which firms
become vertically integrated (e.g., through acquisitions) may be viewed differently. See, e.g.,
Jack Walters & Sons, 737 F.2d at 710 (while vertical integration is lawful and usually procompetitive, if a firm integrates "in an unlawful fashion it would not be immune from liability just
because it had an unexceptionable end in view"). See also the district court opinion in that
case, 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 65,284 (E.D. Wis. 1983), aff'd, 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984), where the court indicated that vertical integration could in certain circumstances be illegal: "a scheme to force independent dealers out of business pursuant
to a plan of vertical integration may be a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act." Id. at
69,682. Courts will also examine the purpose and effects of such integration. United States v.
Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 174. See also Martin B. Glauser Dodge Co. v. Chrysler
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ployment is accompanied by nonprice restrictions on the freedom of
independent distributors to distribute the manufacturer's goods, then legality is less clear and is usually determined by the rule of reason.4 The
use of the third or blended form of distribution, however, raises a number
of legal problems which courts have, as yet, grappled with unsuccessfully.5 From an antitrust perspective, dual distribution is a perplexing
practice that is not easily understood.
Firms that engage in dual distribution come under antitrust scrutiny
because, by definition, they compete at two different levels in the distribution chain. At the production level, the dual distributor competes with
Corp., 570 F.2d 72, 83-84 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); In Re Coca-Cola
Co., 91 F.T.C. 517, 613 n.14 (1978), rev'd, 642 F.2d 1387 (1981). See also U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Merger Guidelines, § 4.221 at 47 (1984), 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823, 26,836 (1984) ("A high
level of vertical integration by upstream firms into the associated retail market may facilitate
collusion in the upstream market by making it easier to monitor price.").
The economic literature generally agrees with the view that vertical integration should
raise no antitrust concern. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 724 (1978) note
that in the absense of market power, "vertical integration lacks antitrust significance. It is
either competitively neutral or affirmatively desirable because it promotes efficiency." See also
R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 227 (1978) [hereinafter ANTITRUST PARADOX]; Adelman, supra note 1; Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an Economic Misconception, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 157 (1954)
[hereinafter Vertical Integration]; McGee & Basset, Vertical Integration Revisited, 19 J. L. &
ECON. 17 (1976). Some critics contend that vertically integrated firms can injure
nonintegrated competitors by exerting either a "price squeeze" or a supply squeeze on the
latter that lowers the latter's revenues or raises their costs. See BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 360-62 (2d ed. 1968) (although noting that such behavior may simply reflect normal
and prudent pursuit of advantages inherent in integration); Comanor, Vertical Mergers, Market Power, and the Antitrust Laws, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 254 (1967); Krattenmaker & Salop,
Anticompetitive Exclusion: RaisingRivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price,96 YALE L.J. 209
(1986); SALOP & SCHEFFmAN, RaisingRivals' Cost, 73 AM. EON. REv. 267 (1983). But other
economists vigorously dispute these views. See S. OPPENHEIM, G. WESTON & J. MCCARTHY,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 356-59 (4th ed. 1981) [hereinafter FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS]
for a summary of the critique of the price and supply squeeze theories as well as criticism of
the view that vertical integration facilitates predatory conduct in general.
See also ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra, at 156-59 on the issue of whether a firm's choice of
distribution patterns imposes costs on rivals. Bork acknowledges that certain distribution patterns and restrictions can raise rivals' costs, but argues that they often represent the optimal or
most efficient pattern or practice. See also Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy, Restricted Distribution, and the Marketfor ExclusionaryRights, 71 MINN. L. Rnv. 1293, 1304-05, 1309-12, 1315
(1987) (cautions against inferring that cost raising strategies are anticompetitive since they can
also increase efficiency).
4. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-59 (1977). See infra note
12 for an explanation of the rule of reason standard.
5. This Article will deal primarily with how the courts have treated antitrust matters
involving dual distribution arrangements. The major theme of this Article is that the legal
approach courts use does not sufficiently take into account the economic effects of such
arrangements.
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other manufacturers of the generic product.' At the distribution level,
the dual distributor competes with independent distributors of its own

brand.7 This latter form of competition has raised antitrust concerns
over the years.
The problem dual distribution presents to antitrust authorities is an-

alytical. How to treat such arrangements, even how to characterize
them, has been a matter of substantial debate among scholars9 and

courts 0 for a number of years.
How dual distribution is perceived is important. Because companyowned and independent distributors operate at the same functional level,

they have been considered to be "horizontal" competitors. Distribution
restrictions imposed by manufacturers involved in dual distribution have
6. Note, Antitrust Treatment of IntrabrandTerritorialRestraints Within a DualDistributional System, 56 TEx. L. REv. 1486, 1489 (1978). Such "competition" is known as "interbrand" competition. The Supreme Court has stated that this form of competition-"the
competition between manufacturers of the same generic product"-is the primary concern of
antitrust law. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 52 n.19.
7. Note, supra note 6, at 1489. This form of "competition" is often referred to as "intrabrand" competition since it involves competing sellers of the same brand of the generic
product.
8. Although case law and literature characterize the relationship between a manufacturer
and its independent distributors as "competitive" in nature, such a characterization is questionable, especially where the parties are acting jointly to maximize their profits. The interests
of competitors are usually antagonistic. But this proposition is not true between a supplier and
its resellers where they are acting jointly to maximize interbrand sales and profits. In such
circumstances, their interests are identical.
The above conclusion does not imply that all their interests are always identical. While
manufacturers and distributors are not rivals, their relationship is prone to problems common
in principal/agent relationships. The action of one party in the relationship can affect the
other's profits. Sufficient incentive incompatibilities exist between manufacturers, distributors
and retailers such that they will not necessarily work smoothly toward maximizing the full
stream profit. Indeed, vertical restraints exist, in part, to minimize these incentive incompatibilities. See Caves, Vertical Restraints in Manufacturer-DistributorRelations: Incidence and
Economic Effects, in ANTITRUST & REGULATION 29 (Grieson ed. 1986); Rey & Tirole, The
Logic of Vertical Restraints, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 921 (1986); Rey & Tirole, VerticalRestraints
from a Principal-Agent Viewpoint, MARKETING CHANNELS, RELATIONSHIP AND PERFORMANCE 3 (L. Pellegrini & S. Reddy ed. 1986).
The law's automatic assumption that the interests of the suppliers and its resellers in a
dual distribution setting are always antagonistic is therefore wrong. Despite dual and independent distributors' mutual interests, this Article will continue to use legal literature and
case law's characterization of their relationship as one that is competitive.
9. Altschuler, Sylvania, VerticalRestraints,and DualDistribution,25 ANTITRuST BULL.
1 (1980); Baker, Interconnected Problemsof Doctrine and Economics in the Section One Labyrinth: Is Sylvania A Way Out?, 67 VA. L. REv. 1457, 1509-15 (1981); Liebeler, Intrabrand
"Cartels" Under GTE Sylvania, 30 UCLA L. REv. 1, 49-50 (1982) [hereinafter Intrabrand
Cartels];Note, supra note 6.
10. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 73-106. Compare American Motor Inns, Inc.
v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975) with Red Diamond, 637 F.2d 1001.
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likewise been treated as "horizontal" and, therefore, illegal per se under
the Sherman Act."' Yet the same restrictions imposed by a manufacturer not involved in dual distribution are treated as "vertical" and subject to the less harsh "rule of reason" analysis.12 Thus, manufacturers

who compete with their independent distributors for customers further
down the line of distribution are treated differently from manufacturers

who rely exclusively on independent distributors or manufacturers who
are completely vertically integrated.
This Article will discuss dual distribution as a method of competition, focusing on how this distribution pattern interacts with both the
manufacturer's pricing policy and the restrictions the manufacturer im11. Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination ....
or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce... ." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). An arrangement
or practice that is illegal per se is one that is conclusively presumed to be anticompetitive as
well as one that lacks any efficiency creating effects. The Supreme Court described the rule of
per se illegality in the following famous passage.
iThere are certain agreements or practices which because of theirperniciouseffect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they
have caused or the business excuse for their use.
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (emphasis added).
12. One court has noted an "emerging tendency" of courts to view dual distribution arrangements as vertical and, thus, subject to rule of reason analysis where distribution restrictions do not lessen interbrand competition or restrict output. See Midwestern Waffles, Inc. v.
Waffle House, Inc., 734 F.2d 705, 720 (11th Cir. 1984). Under the rule of reason, the plaintiff
must prove that the challenged practice or arrangement is anticompetitive. The practice undergoes a more comprehensive evaluation called the rule of reason balancing inquiry. In the
balancing inquiry, the purported purpose or justification is taken into account. Justice Brandeis articulated the rule of reason standard in a passage better known for its breadth than for
its precision.
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect,
actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason
for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to
interpret facts and to predict consequences.
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
More recently, the Supreme Court articulated a standard that distinguished between these
two rules-i.e., rule of reason versus per se rule-in terms that are economically relevant. The
Court stated:
[O]ur inquiry must focus on... whether the practice facially appears to be one that
would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output...
or instead one designed to "increase economic efficiency and render markets more,
rather than less, competitive."
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) (quoting
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978)).
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poses upon its distributors. This Article will then explore the antitrust
implications raised by competition between manufacturer-owned and independently-owned distributors.
Section II of this Article will look at dual distribution in its generic
sense and will describe how the law treats this arrangement. While dual
distribution generates little concern by itself, problems arise if these arrangements are combined with nonprice restraints on competing independent distributors. Since the law of dual distribution is closely
related to the law of vertical nonprice restraints, section III will describe
the process courts undertake to determine the proper legal standard in
matters involving nonprice restraints. This section will then briefly summarize the relevant case law.
A survey of the leading cases that constitute an evolving law of dual
distribution will follow. The cases are divided, on a rough scale, into
those cases where the courts view the restrictions imposed by dual distributors as constituting "horizontal" arrangements, discussed in section
IV, and those regarded as "vertical," discussed in section V. These sections will also describe the conflict in case law between a formalistic approach to the law of dual distribution and one that analyzes such
arrangements by their potential economic effects. As will be seen, the
conflict is endemic to both horizontal and vertical cases. The vertical
cases described in section V combine elements of both approaches. However, a trend is slowly evolving towards incorporating economic analysis.
The survey of cases in section V is arranged in a manner to reflect this
slow evolution.
Section VI highlights three opinions that depart most vividly from
the usual formalistic approach in favor of one that relies heavily upon
economic analysis. Two of these opinions are dissenting ones. Section
VII formulates a framework based on economic factors that can be applied in dual distribution cases. Finally, section VIII concludes with a
critique of the legal approach that has prevailed despite the recent inroads of the economic alternative.

II.

DUAL DISTRIBUTION AS A LEGAL ARRANGEMENT

Few cases have ruled on the issue of whether dual distribution-a
distribution arrangement whereby a manufacturer is said to compete
with its independent distributors-is, by itself, legal under the antitrust
laws. In the usual case, dual distribution arises in connection with some
other activity in which the manufacturer has engaged-e.g., the imposition of territorial or customer restrictions on its distributors or subsidization of company-owned distributors. Thus, the representative dual
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distribution case entails a combination of simple dual distribution and
additional vertical restraints on competition. The existence of dual dis-

tribution, as will be seen, usually colors the court's view of the ancillary
practice in question.
When considered by itself, courts have found the practice of dual
distribution to be legal. For example, in Rea v. Ford Motor Co., an
automobile manufacturer operated both factory-owned retail stores and
"dealer development stores," and thus competed with its independent
dealers. The Rea court stated: "We have no doubt that there is nothing

inherently evil in a dual distribution system whereby a manufacturer may
sell its own products to the customers directly through company outlets

along side [sic] independent dealers." 14
The Tenth Circuit expressed a similar view with regard to a manufacturer's practice of selling laminates and adhesives directly to large ac-

counts. The Tenth Circuit stated that the manufacturer's practice of
"selling directly to certain large accounts reflects a dual distribution sys-

tem that standing alone, is perfectly lawful ....""
Courts not only tolerate wide discretion in a seller's choice of a distribution system, but also in the modification of that system after it is

established, even if some intrabrand competitors are harmed. As the
District Court for the District of Columbia noted: "A seller does not

commit himself irrevocably to one method of distribution once commenced, and he may terminate, modify, and change his distribution sys-

tem so long as his arrangements are legal. The agency system is a lawful
and well-accepted means of distribution."' 6
Distribution by the manufacturer comes under closer scrutiny, how13. 355 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Pa. 1972), vacated, 497 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1974).
14. Id. at 865.
15. Dart Industries v. Plunkett Co., 704 F.2d 496, 499 (10th Cir. 1983). But see Pitofsky,
The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REv.
1, 28, 31-32 (1978) (arguing that a manufacturer's retention of a class of customers should be
per se illegal).
16. Newberry v. Washington Post Co., 438 F. Supp. 470, 484 (D.D.C. 1977). In In re
Coca-Cola Co., the Federal Trade Commission commented:
It should be noted that soft drink syrup producers ...may be able to enter new
markets nationwide... by offering exclusive trademark licenses of limited duration
to existing bottlers or by encouraging new bottlers into the market. If the search for
independent capital is unsuccessful or if an independent bottler decides to withdraw
from the market, a syrup company may then decide to integrate vertically in order to
preserve its market position. Should it, in fact, integrate under these circumstances, it
would, of course, be entering the "bottling level," but we do not read Topco as condemning this type of dual distribution program as a horizontal market allocation
arrangement.
91 F.T.C. 517, 613 n.14 (1978), rev'd, 642 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (emphasis added). See
infra note 116. This approval of vertical integration, however, is unduly narrow. The commis-
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ever, when the issue of predation is also involved. That issue most frequently arises in cases involving the relationship between automobile
manufacturers and their dealers. 17 No case has sustained a judgment

against an automobile manufacturer for operating its own dealerships.
However, some cases have recognized the possibility that in certain circumstances, such as where the manufacturer's dealers were also engaged
in predatory pricing, an independent automobile dealer could recover for

the injury to its business caused by competition from a factory dealership. 8 One court described the state of the law regarding manufacturer
predation in the context of dual distribution as follows: "It is true that

practices which are not unlawful in isolation may, when combined with a
predatory purpose, constitute an illegal restraint of trade. '"' 9
Independent dealers have also claimed that factory dealerships are
subsidized, permitting them to drive the independents out of business.

However, mere subsidies from the manufacturer to the factory dealer for
the purpose of increasing market penetration are not illegal. As the
Third Circuit has pointed out, subsidizing a dealer has no different competitive effect than if the dealer obtains more favorable financing from a
bank or venture capital investment firm.2" Still, most courts find the is-

sue of "manufacturer predation" troubling, especially when it arises in
dual distribution litigation. While the manufacturer is free to contractu-

ally end its business relationship with independent dealers directly, it apparently cannot do so indirectly through price competition.21
sion's statement implies that such integration may not be reasonable under more general circumstances. Such an implication is not sound on economic grounds. See supra note 3.
17. Independent automobile dealers have brought numerous actions against their suppliers, domestic automobile manufacturers, for operating or financing factory dealerships in direct competition with them. The manufacturer's right to do so, however, has withstood these
challenges. Thus, in a challenge to the American Motors Corp. (AMC) the court stated that it
"cannot conclude that [AMC's] lawful decision to place a competing dealership in the area
runs afoul of the antitrust laws since 'the purpose of the Sherman Act is to protect competition, not competitors.'" Speed Auto Sales, Inc. v. American Motors Corp., 477 F. Supp.
1193, 1196 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (citations omitted).
18. See Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1975); England v.
Chrysler Corp., 493 F.2d 269 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Mount Lebanon
Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 453 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
19. Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldgs., Inc., 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) V65,284,
at 69,682 (E.D. Wis. 1983), aff'd, 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984).
20. Martin B. Glauser Dodge Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 570 F.2d 72, 85-86 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978).
21. See Rea, 355 F. Supp. 842, where Ford Motor Co. subsidized its subsidiary dealership
losses. The district court reasoned:
The evidence here shows that Ford Motor Company, the defendant, is the only
source of Ford and Lincoln-Mercury automobiles, trucks and other automotive
products. An independent Ford Dealer has a large investment in money and goodwill tied up in Ford vehicles and facilities for them. Under the terms of the sales
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In contrast to the pure dual distribution case, or to the dual distribution case involving predation, most of the litigated cases involve both
dual distribution and the use of various ancillary vertical constraints.
Some courts have ruled that the existence of dual distribution does not
change the way ancillary vertical practices should be viewed. The Fifth
Circuit, for example, in ruling that a manufacturer's imposition of territorial and customer restrictions upon its distributors was not illegal per
se, stated: "[t]hat [the manufacturer] also distributed some of its own

goods does not alter the situation." 2 In another case,23 the plaintiff challenged restraints a manufacturer had imposed on its district managers.
While the court rejected the plaintiff's characterization of the relation-

ship as one of dual distribution, it also noted, "the import of such a finding of competition would not be significant."'2 4

Most courts, however, react skeptically to restraints dual distributors impose on competing independent distributors. 2 At the very least,
they evaluate behavior by such firms with greater scrutiny. This occurs

even in cases holding that the rule of reason governs such restraints. For
example, the Fifth Circuit in Abadir & Co. v. First Mississippi Corp.,26

stated: "[T]hose normal market factors encouraging a supplier to let its
distributors compete are less effective to the extent that [the defendant-

'2
manufacturer] also competes as a distributor." '
Such judicial caution towards restrictions accompanying dual distri-

bution arrangements apparently is widespread. Thus, in Graphic Prodagreement, he must use his best efforts to achieve the full extent of Ford market
penetration reasonably anticipated in his area. He cannot turn to another manufacturer for vehicles. If he is shut off, he strangles to death in a short time. Thus, if
Ford for its own purpose chooses to use its company stores and dealer development
agencies for the purpose of maximizing its profits through large subsidies to these
company-owned facilities with the result that private dealers are put at a substantial
economic disadvantage, it is the court's opinion that a cause of action is made out
under Sherman 1.
Id. at 867. Of course, it is not in the interest of Ford to unduly "squeeze" or eliminate efficient
distributorships. It is apparent, however, that the only concern of the courts in these cases is
to preserve the viability of all existing independent dealerships without taking into account
whether they are efficient.
22. Abadir & Co. v. First Miss. Corp., 651 F.2d 422, 425 (5th Cir. 1981). But cf. Krehl v.
Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 78 F.R.D. 108 (C.D. Cal. 1978). In Krehl, the court implied
that dual distribution changed the legal form of a franchisor's distribution arrangement: "If
BRICO were the franchisor and nothing more, this system would indeed be vertical." Id at
123.
23. Laurence J.Gordon, Inc. v. Brandt, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 1144 (W.D. Wash. 1983).
24. Id. at 1152 (citations omitted).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 35-37.
26. 651 F.2d 422.
27. Id at 427.
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ucts Distributors,Inc. v. Itek Corp.,28 a dual distributor's restraints were
considered vertical and subject to evaluation under the rule of reason, yet
the Eleventh Circuit warned: "Although we treat Itek's restraints as vertical, its motivation to restrict competition from its independent distribu29
tors is a factor in our analysis of its alleged pro-competitive purposes."
Other courts consider the context in which dual distribution occurs
in assessing its legality. For example, in Rea v. Ford Motor Co.,30 the
court stated: "Whether dual distribution is or is not illegal or evil in and
of itself, it does become an antitrust problem in the context of its use by a
company possessing substantial market power." 3
Some courts are even more harsh. In Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta
Corp.,32 the court suggested that dual distribution has a synergistic-and
by implication harmful-effect on vertical restrictions. "The Court
notes, however, that proof of the existence of unlawful resale price maintenance, where the manufacturer is also a distributor.., makes the antitrust violation even more pernicious... for unlawful cartel activity then
co-exists with the attempt33 to vertically control the discretion of the independent businessman."
And some courts, apparently mesmerized by the presence of dual
distribution, carry out the synergy even further. As one court observed
in 1979: "A number of lower courts have held.., that the presence of
dual distribution transforms intrabrand restrictions otherwise vertical in
origin into horizontal ones."3 4
Despite the fact that dual distribution by itself is considered legal,
the harsh language cited above, reflects at best, an ambivalent attitude,
and at worst, overt hostility toward such a system when it is accompanied by restrictions on competing intrabrand distributors. The belief that
restrictions imposed by a manufacturer/distributor are motivated by an
anticompetitive purpose underlies much of the litigation in this area.
28. 717 F.2d 1560 (1lth Cir. 1983).
29. Id. at 1576 (footnote omitted). In fact, the court's implication that manufacturers
have an incentive to restrict competition more severely at the distribution level when the manufacturer also distributes is wrong. The manufacturer's attitude toward restrictions on intrabrand competition should be the same no matter how its distribution network is arranged.
See Baker, supra note 9, at 1510-11.
30. 355 F. Supp. 842.
31. Id. at 867. But see IntrabrandCartels,supra note 9, at 3 n.11 and 26 n.78 (implies that

market power is irrelevant in assessing the nature of an intrabrand restriction, since even a
monopolist has no incentive to impose distribution restrictions that adversely affect efficiency
and consumer welfare).
32. 295 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 417 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1969).
33. Id. at 718 n.2.
34. Krehl, 1979-2 Trade Cas. at 78,704.
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III. DUAL DISTRIBUTION AND NONPRICE RESTRAINTS
When dual distribution is combined with restrictions on the freedom
of independent distributors, problems from an antitrust perspective arise.
This should not necessarily follow since if dual distribution by itself is
legal and a practice ancillary to such a system is legal, the two together
should be legal."5 However, many courts do not accept this view and
find illegality in instances where both dual distribution and the suspect
vertical practice would be legal if standing alone. 36 This anomaly is seen
as a legacy from cases that evaluated distribution arrangements by their
"form" and generally viewed them as being "horizontal." Under the
analysis adopted in such cases, the relationship of manufacturers with
their distributors comes under greater scrutiny. As one commentator
noted:
With the added element of dual distribution, however, a manufacturer enters into actual or potential competition with its independent distributors. For this reason, the same territorial or
customer restrictions that were previously viewed as vertical
may be reclassified as market allocations among competitors, or
horizontalrestraints of trade, which remain subject to rigid per
se prohibition.37
In most dual distribution cases, the controversy centers not upon
the manufacturer's-presence at the distribution level, but upon the manufacturer's imposition of restrictions upon independent distributors. In
dual distribution cases, therefore, courts will look to the law of distributional restraints to determine whether the challenged restrictions accompanying such arrangements are legal. Under the guidelines the Supreme
Court enunciated in ContinentalT V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,38 a cru35. This is analogous to the Ancillary Restraints Doctrine Judge Taft developed in United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899),
where he proclaimed that restrictions "only ancillary to the main end" of a legitimate business

union "were to be encouraged." Id. at 280.
36. See, eg., American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir.
1975).
37. Altschuler, supra note 9, at 2 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).

38. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). Sylvania involved a challenge to a manufacturer's distribution
system in which the distributors-franchised retailers-were restricted to specific geographic
areas. The challenge came from a former dealer who was terminated for violating these location restrictions. Id. at 38-40. Overruling United States v. Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
(1967), the Court held that nonprice vertical restrictions such as the challenged location clause
are governed by the rule of reason. Id. at 40, 59. However, the Court articulated two exceptions to its ruling: 1) where economic effects demonstrated that vertical restrictions deserve to
be treated more stringently--"we do not foreclose the possibility that particular applications of
vertical restrictions might justify per se prohibition under Northern Pacific Railroad Co. But
we do make clear that departure from the rule-of-reason standard must be based upon demon-
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cial issue is whether the distribution restrictions are vertical or horizontal. Under Sylvania, horizontal restraints are illegal per se,3 9 while
nonprice vertical restraints are governed by the rule of reason standard. 4'
Sylvania, in effect, requires courts in dual distribution cases to characterize the restrictions at issue as either vertical or horizontal. At the
same time, Sylvania emphasizes that the determination of legality of distributional restraints "must be based upon demonstrable economic effect
rather than . . . upon formalistic line drawing.""a While Sylvania requires courts to rely upon economic analysis in deciding distribution issues, its distinction between "vertical" and "horizontal" restraints forces
courts to engage in the very "formalistic line drawing" it purports to be
eschewing.4 2 Nowhere is this more apparent than in the characterization
analysis courts undertake in dual distribution cases.
A.

The CharacterizationProcess

1. The vertical-horizontal test
The "characterization process" is the term used to describe the analysis courts make in determining whether a challenged practice is to be
governed by the per se or the rule of reason standard. The outcome of
this process is important because under the per se standard, all debate
regarding legality ends. If a practice is subject to the rule of reason, however, its legality will be litigated under that standard. Since Sylvania, the
characterization process in dual distribution cases has focused almost exclusively on whether the distribution arrangement is vertical or
horizontal.4 3
The distinction between horizontal and vertical restraints, however,
has not always been crucial in deciding the legality of nonprice restraints
in dual distribution cases. Prior to 1967, nonprice vertical restraints
strable economic effect ....
id. at 58-59; and 2) where the challenged restrictions originated
"in agreements among the retailers[,] [t]here is no doubt that [such] restrictions... would be
illegal per se ....
Id. at 58 n.28.
Ironically, Sylvania abandoned a dual distribution system in favor of a more traditional
distribution system in order to increase market share. This illustrates that different distributional arrangements and restrictions are usually imposed or excised because of changing market considerations rather than for anticompetitive purposes. While Sylvania was not a dual
distribution case, it greatly affected the outcome of such cases because it involved the sarhe
kind of restrictions imposed by dual distributors.

39. 433 U.S. at 58 n.28.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 57-59.
Id. at 59.
IntrabrandCartels,supra note 9, at 2.
See 433 U.S. 36, 57-59 (1977).
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But between

1967 and 1977, a dual distributor's vertical as well as horizontal restraints were regarded as illegal per se as a result of the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn, & Co.4" In Schwinn, the
Court held that while a dual distributor's nonprice restraints were vertical, they were nevertheless illegal per se.46 Application of the per se approach to most distributional restraints was halted in 1977 when the
Supreme Court decided the Sylvania case. In Sylvania, the Court reversed its holding in Schwinn and declared that nonprice vertical restraints were subject to the rule of reason standard.4 7
Cases involving dual distribution today are initially analyzed on the

basis of the court's perception as to whether the arrangement is horizontal or vertical rather than on an economic analysis of the arrangement.48
The only difference between post-Sylvania cases and pre-Sylvania cases is

that restrictions viewed as vertical are now analyzed under the rule of
reason. Moreover, courts have shown a clear tendency to interpret dual
distribution arrangements in post-Sylvania cases as vertical, whereas
44. It may be more accurate to say that prior to United States v. Arnold, Schwinn, & Co.,
388 U.S. 365 (1967), the courts upheld such arrangements. Posner argues that contrary to
conventional wisdom, the rule of reason was rarely applied prior to Schwinn and, in fact, is
"rarely used to decide [antitrust] cases." Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 14 (1977) [hereinafter Rule
of Reason]. In any case, before 1961, nonprice vertical restraints were subject to the rule of
reason, even where dual distribution was involved. In 1961, the Justice Department challenged territorial and customer restrictions imposed by White Motor Co., a truck manufacturer, that prohibited its dealers from reselling to certain large accounts reserved for itself. See
United States v. White Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Oh. 1961), rev'd, 372 U.S. 253
(1963). However, in 1963, the Supreme Court rejected the Justice Department's challenge and
refused to hold that White's vertical restrictions were subject to the per se rule established in
horizontal market-division cases. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
45. 388 U.S. 365.
46. Id. at 382. The per se standard governed vertical restraints where title passed from the
supplier of the goods to the reseller. Only if the supplier retained ownership-such as in consignment sales-would such restrictions still be governed by the rule of reason standard. Id.
47. 433 U.S. at 57-59. In overruling Schwinn's vertical per se rule, the Sylvania Court did
not completely preclude application of a per se standard in appropriate cases involving vertical
restraints. The Court stated: "[W]e do not foreclose the possibility that particular applications of vertical restrictions might justify per se prohibition .... " Id. at 58.
48. Since Sylvania, the form of distributional restraints and, correspondingly, judicial perceptions of such forms, have taken on a greater importance than in the past. While the legal
treatment of horizontal distributional restraints has remained the same-per se illegal-the
changes in status pertaining to vertical restraints look like a ping pong game. Prior to Schwinn
and following Sylvania, nonprice vertical restraints were generally regarded as lawful. In between those two decisions-for a period spanning a decade-vertical restraints on distributors
were treated the same as horizontal ones, illegal per se. After Sylvania, such restraints were
treated as illegal per se only if they were part of a "horizontal" arrangement, since Sylvania's
rule of reason approach applied only to vertical restraints.
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before they were seen as horizontal.4 9
While the change in results has been praised, the continued reliance
by most courts on a mechanical classification framework has been criticized. The criticism is two-pronged. First, some argue that the horizontal-vertical analysis is irrelevant since dual distribution restrictions
should never be considered "horizontal"; they are simply manufacturing

arrangements.5 0 Second, such an analysis is hardly an "economic" one,
and any resulting "good" decisions are merely accidental.5 "
2.

The source test

Recognizing that sole reliance on the vertical-horizontal distinction
49. A bizarre aspect of Schwinn and Sylvania is the impact those two decisions have had
on the characterization process. Following Schwinn, most courts viewed distribution restraints
imposed by dual distributors as horizontal. Nevertheless, their characterization had little
practical significance since most vertical restraints were also illegal per se. After Sylvania,
most courts shifted gears and decided that restrictions associated with dual distribution arrangements were "vertical" and thus governed by the rule of reason. Ironically, shifts in the
prevailing legal standard for vertical nonprice restraints-per se versus rule of reason-also
colored the way courts viewed the form of the restraints-vertical versus horizontal. One
commentator summarized the abrupt changes in classification and legal status and the resulting confusion between issues of classification and those of legal standard as follows:
Thus, an interesting picture develops. Before Schwinn, when nonprice vertical restraints were subject to the rule of reason, courts refused (or neglected) to view dual
distribution as triggering the per se rule applicable to horizontal restraints. Following Schwinn, courts consistently took precisely that position. Now, however, with
Sylvania's reinstatement of the rule of reason, courts are again refusing (or neglecting) to apply the horizontal approach, with a few notable exceptions. The majority
of cases decided after Sylvania treat dual distribution restraints exclusively under the
rule of reason.
Altschuler, supra note 9, at 84 (footnotes omitted).
50. Two economists in the Economic Policy Office of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice have criticized the view that restraints imposed by a dual distributor are horizontal or part of a collusive arrangement between the manufacturer's and independent
dealerships.
To appreciate the flaw in this horizontal analogy, suppose first that the manufacturer was completely vertically integrated and imposed the same restraints as before
on the company owned outlets. There would be no antitrust objection to these restraints in this case; certainly no horizontal aspect could be argued. Now suppose
that the same restraints were imposed on independent dealers by a manufacturer who
was entirely nonintegrated into distribution. The manufacturer would not impose
the restraints solely to grant dealers supracompetitive profits, as would a dealer cartel, since he would prefer to collect those profits himself. Again, the motivation
would be purely vertical-e.g., combating free riding among dealers. The situation is
no different when, instead of being entirely nonintegrated or integrated, the manufacturer is engaged in dual distribution. The restraints on independent dealers should be
viewed as imposed by the manufacturer qua manufacturer not qua dealer, destroying
any parallel with a horizontal dealer conspiracy.
Schwartz & Eisenstadt, supra note 2, at 73-74.
51. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 9, at 1509-13; IntrabrandCartels,supra note 9, at 49-50;
Note, supra note 6, at 1490-91. See also infra text accompanying notes 65-67.
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is unsatisfactory, some courts also look to the origin of any challenged

distributional restriction.5 2 If the restriction originates from the manufacturer, the arrangement is deemed vertical and subject to the rule of
reason. But if it is initiated by dealers or distributors acting in concert
with themselves or with the manufacturer, a horizontal conspiracy or
cartel is presumed, and the arrangement is deemed illegal per se.
While this test is somewhat of an improvement, it remains unsatisfactory. 3 The source test is based on the view that the restrictions a
manufacturer imposes on its distributors are a manifestation of legitimate
business judgment-a decision of little or no antitrust significance.5 4 But
a restraint originating from distributors is either one that is made among
competitors or is one that makes the manufacturer an instrumentality of
its distributors-either alternative of which has antitrust significance.
That there should be any antitrust significance for the latter has been
severely criticized for two principal reasons.
The first reason the source of a distributional restraint should not be
determinative is the practical difficulty in determining where a given restriction originated. When the source is not apparent, courts will look to
the possible motives and purposes behind the restraints. Most commentators, however, are skeptical of the legal system's ability to pinpoint true
motives, and therefore of the ability to distinguish between dealer cartels
52. The landmark case which determined legality by focusing on the true source of a restraint was United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966). See also Abadir &
Co. v. First Miss. Corp., 651 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1981); Red Diamond Supply Inc. v. Liquid
Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981); H&B Equip. Co.
v. International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1978); Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v.
Michelin Tire Corp., 483 F. Supp. 750 (D. Md. 1980).
53. It is an improvement because it at least does not question restrictions imposed by
manufacturer/distributors on independent distributors. However, the source test condemns
those restrictions originating from or initiated by dealers or distributors.
54. This viewpoint is not universally held. Professor Pitofsky, for example, argues that a
per se rule should apply whenever a dual distributor "carves out an area or category of sale
which it then retains exclusively for itself." Pitofsky, supra note 15, at 31. Alfred Dougherty,
former Director of the FTC's Bureau of Competition stated that in such circumstances: "The
manufacturer is in effect using the leverage created by the vertical relationship to insulate itself
in its capacity as a retailer from the vigorous competition of other retailers." Dougherty,
VerticalRestraints Recent FTC Initiatives (remarks delivered at the National Antitrust Seminar of the National Association of Attorneys General) (Aug. 16, 1979), at 5-6 (cited in Altschuler, Sylvania, VerticalRestraints, andDualDistribution, 25 ANTIMusT BULL. 1, 28 n.79
(1980)). These views, however, conflict with any reasonable analysis of the economics of vertical relationships including dual distribution. See infra text accompanying notes 235-38. If a
manufacturer is free to distribute entirely by itself-i.e., to vertically integrate-it is not clear
why partial self-distribution accompanied by intrabrand restrictions should raise antitrust
concerns.
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and restrictions that serve the manufacturer's interests.5 5
The second reason courts should not blindly rely on source to determine legality is that even if it is possible to identify a restriction's origin,
such an identification may mean little in economic terms. As Professor
Liebeler commented: "The statement that someone 'imposed' something
is not a meaningful statement in economic terms, and, in addition, is a
poor way to determine whether an arrangement is horizontal or vertical.... A more relevant inquiry is whether an arrangement has the
potential to restrict output." 6 Of course, a dealer-originated restriction
may be anticompetitive, as well as efficiency enhancing. 7 The source
test, however, simply assumes that restrictions originating from distributors are anticompetitive.5 8
Reliance solely on the source test is especially dubious where the
55. See IntrabrandCartels,supra note 9, at 24-30; and Rule of Reason, supra note 44, at
20.
56. Liebeler, Book Review, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1317, 1334 n.41 (1978) (reviewing R. BORK,
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLIcY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978)).

57. As Liebeler explained:
Even if we were able to determine in a particular case that the restriction originated
in joint action by the resellers, that would not dispose of the economic issue involved.
For dealers, too, have an incentive to adopt, or urge their supplier to adopt, arrangements that increase the efficiency of the distribution system.
IntrabrandCartels,supra note 9, at 10 (footnote omitted).
An example of such efficiency enhancing activity is where dealers band together and persuade their supplier to rid the distribution system of free riders. Liebeler argues that this is
what was really going on in the GeneralMotors case. Id. at 25.
The "free rider" problem occurs when consumers purchase products from discounters
after receiving valuable information or pre-sale services from a full-service dealer. Both the
discounter and the consumer in this situation are considered to be "free riders." Both benefit
from the free services or information the full-service dealer provides. The free rider problem is
an example of what economists call an externality. A manufacturer who desires to sell his
product only when value-enhancing services are provided will take measures to prevent free
riding by distributors and consumers. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55. See also Davis-Watkins
Co. v. Service Merchandise, 686 F.2d 1190, 1195 n.8 (6th Cir. 1982); Gerhart, The Supreme
Court and Antitrust Analysis: The (Near) Triumph of the Chicago School, 1982 Sup. Cr. REv.
319, 337-40; IntrabrandCartels,supra note 9, at I n.4.
For a reseller cartel to be anticompetitive, the resellers must have market power over each
supplier's product and the restrictions they impose must have no efficiency creating potential.
Such activity really constitutes an interbrand dealer cartel as opposed to the more common
intrabranddealer cartel. See Liebeler, 1983 Economic Review of Antitrust Developmentsv The
Distinction Between Price andNonprice Distribution Restrictions, 31 UCLA L. REV. 384, 40506 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Antitrust Developments].
58. Because dealers have an incentive to increase the efficiency of their distribution system,
it is wrong to assume that joint activity by dealers is always aimed at cartelization. See IntrabrandCartels,supra note 9, at 22 n.67. This view is not universally shared. See position of
FTC Commissioner Streno (request, demand or threat by dealers must be most important
contributing cause of a dealer termination for a finding of conspiracy to fix prices) in connection with proposed legislation regarding resale price-fixing as reported in FTC Watch, at 5
(Feb. 8, 1988).

June 1988]

DUAL DISTRIBUTION AND ANTITRUST LAW

1289

distributors carry only one supplier's products. Some commentators
contend that even when dealers collude or form a cartel and impose their
will on the supplier, little reason to be concerned exists. 9 While such an

intrabrand cartel would concern the supplier, its operation should not
affect the final output to the market. Even in these conditions, the dealers have no incentive to restrict output or increase prices beyond that of
the joint (supplier-distributor) profit maximizing level. These dealers
cannot enhance the market power that their profit maximizing supplier
already holds. While an intrabrand dealer cartel may affect the distribution of profits between dealers and the supplier, it should not affect output to consumers since both suppliers and dealers have a considerable

interest in achieving a level of output that maximizes their joint profit
level.'
The idea that an intrabrand dealer cartel or intrabrand dealer collu-

sion can impose no additional harm to consumers-in the form of output
restriction or higher prices-is based on the theory of successive monopoly. 61 This theory states that only one monopoly profit can be obtained
59. The Supreme Court in part supports this view. In Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv.
Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 760-64 (1984), the Court held that a vertical price-fixing agreement between a manufacturer and its distributors cannot be inferred solely from the existence of complaints about a terminated distributor's prices from other distributors, or even from the fact
that the termination came in response to complaints. On the other hand, evidence that the
manufacturer and non-terminated distributors were not acting independently would support
such a charge. This is consistent with the Court's holding in Sylvania that restrictions
"originating in agreements among retailers" are illegal per se. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 58 n.28.
The second part of the Court's analysis is unsound, according to Liebeler, because it does not
take into account the efficiency-creating justification for joint dealer/manufacturer action: to
rid the distribution system of a free riding dealer. See 1983 Antitrust Developments, supra note
57, at 408-13.
Bork cites two practical reasons why such cartels pose little concern: (1) cartelization
among resellers is very difficult to maintain; and (2) is very easy for enforcement authorities to
detect. THE ANTIrrRusT PARADOX, supra note 3, at 292-93. Also, the notion that dealers
impose their will on the manufacturer should be viewed with more than the usual dose of
skepticism, for it amounts to saying that manufacturers will take actions that are against their
own interest. As Bork has aptly observed, a manufacturer "will not adopt marketing strategies
that transfer money from his pocket to the pockets of his retailers." Bork, Vertical Restraints
Schwinn Overruled, 1977 Sup. Cr. REv. 171, 188. See also Baker, supra note 9, at 1507-08.
60. As Professor Baker also explained:
A dominant cartel of dealers... presumably would recognize that its interest [in the
efficient operation of the distribution system] is precisely the same [as the manufacturer's]. If, by virtue of overwhelming bargaining power, the dealers were able to
take the lion's share of the overall profits from the sale of the product, leaving the
manufacturer only the minimum competitive return on investment, they too would
seek to enhance the interbrand competitiveness of the product and to hold costs to
minimum.
Id. at 1490.
61. The theory of successive monopoly applies only to exclusive distribution arrangements
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for a good.6 2 If a manufacturer is behaving like a monopolist, adding

another monopolist at the distribution level will not increase monopoly
profits. In other words, if a manufacturer is already extracting the maximum available profit, the formation of an intrabrand dealer cartel will

not increase this profit. At best, an effective cartel acting to maximize
profits could extract some of the monopoly profit away from the manu-

facturer. But this allocation of monopoly profits would have no bearing
on consumers. Since neither manufacturers nor dealers have an incentive
to restrict output or increase prices beyond the maximum profit level,
manufacturers and dealers actingjointly should have no adverse impact
upon consumers. Such joint action, at worst, can cause no more harm
than a monopolist at the manufacturing level.3
To summarize, if dealers, by colluding among themselves and with
the manufacturer, can gain no more market power than the manufacturer already possesses, then the source of any challenged restrictions is
not of great significance. Moreover, vertical restrictions, including those4
originating from the dealer level, may be imposed to enhance efficiency.r
Finally, interbrand competition will constrain both manufacturers and
dealers, even when acting jointly. The courts in dual distribution cases,
however, completely miss these points when considering the source of a
restriction.
where the output to the consumer is produced with fixed proportions of manufactured product
and distribution services.
62. According to Oppenheim, Weston & McCarthy, "[a] common 'misconception" held
by critics of vertical integration, "is that the integrated concern earns 'double profits' from
having two stages of its operations which gives it a competitive advantage." FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 3, at 356. The theory of successive monopoly rejects the notion that
such a firm can earn double profits. Instead, it can earn "merely a normal return on its investment in each market, the amount of which would be determined by competitive conditions in
each market." Id. at 357 (footnote omitted). See also VerticalIntegration,supranote 3, at 172
n.65, 195-97.
63. See IntrabrandCartels,supra note 9 at 20-23, and 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 725, at 200-08 (1978). Liebeler does distinguish between reseller cartels involving the supplier and cartels not involving the supplier. The latter, he contends, "should
continue to be illegal per se [,]" because joint profit maximization is less probable where the
supplier is not involved in the cartel. IntrabrandCartels, supra note 9, at 5 n.18. If the
manufacturer and its distributors do not act in concert, and instead attempt to attain the maximum profit independently, the overall combined profit will be reduced. Consumers will also
suffer because output will be lower and prices will be higher. See supra text accompanying
notes 60-63.
64. In Sylvania, the Supreme Court stated: "Vertical restrictions promote interbrand competition by allowing the manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of his
products." Id. at 54. See also supra notes 57 and 58.
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The EnduringLegacy of Formalism

One commentator has described the process by which post-Sylvania
courts characterize dual distributional restrictions as "a simplistic categorization analysis that focuses solely on the physical presence of a manufacturer on the distribution level in an intrabrand competitive
capacity[.] ' '6 5 Decisions that characterize arrangements on the basis of
form or source can hardly be described as opinions based on "economic
effect." While the "right" results may now be occurring, they are being
arrived at for the wrong reasons. Application of the governing legal standard-per se or rule of reason-does not depend upon a distribution arrangement's potential economic effects, but upon the location of the
manufacturer within that arrangement. The problem is that the distinction between horizontal and vertical arrangements is formalistic and divorced from economic realities. As Professor Liebeler has commented:
The hope that the law of vertical restraints might be based on
something other than formalistic line drawing, however, has
gone largely unrealized in the five years since Sylvania was decided. No doubt this is due in part to the fact that many lawyers and judges are unfamiliar with or hostile to an economic
approach to antitrust law. It is also due, however, to the fact
that the Sylvania opinion itself was flawed by formalistic linedrawing. It was flawed to such a degree as to make inevitable
the confusion that now afflicts the lower courts and most of the
academic writing in this area of the law. 66
Additional reasons explain why Sylvania did not lead to a greater
change in the way courts analyze dual distribution cases. Although Sylvania calls for an economic approach to deciding cases involving vertical
restraints, it did not specify what such an approach entails. Moreover,
Sylvania, in the words of one commentator, "created an enormous tension between itself and earlier cases that had been decided primarily on
formalistic grounds."'67 This failure to explain the economic approach
permits the traditional analysis to continue by default. Sylvania's reliance on a horizontal-vertical distinction thus is hardly a significant departure from previous decisions based on formalistic grounds.
65. Note, supra note 6, at 1490.
66. IntrabrandCartels,supra note 9, at 2. An example of a post-Sylvania case based on
form rather than upon an analysis of economic effect is In re Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517
(1978), rev'd, 642 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1981), where the Federal Trade Commission stated
that in light of Sylvania, "the first step in evaluating these restraints is to classify them as
horizontal or vertical." Id. at 611.
67. 1983 Antitrust Developments, supra note 57, at 387.
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It would, however, be misleading to state that Sylvania only altered
the results, but not the underlying analysis in subsequent cases. While
change has not been as dramatic as some commentators had hoped, the
analysis applied in dual distribution cases has evolved slowly. Recent
cases that apply the rule of reason analysis reflect a slight shift away from
"formalistic line drawing" and have moved toward an analysis of the
economic effects of distribution restraints. As will be seen in the following discussion, these cases combine elements of economic analysis while
still clinging to vestiges of form.
Despite the inroads made by economic analysis in the post-Sylvania
era, the crucial issue remains whether the suspect restraints are horizontal or vertical. A review of the cases indicates that characterization analyses are inconsistent. Moreover, the analyses are clouded because
although most courts characterize the accompanying restraintson distribution, some courts characterize the entire distributional system. Alternatively, in some cases, the courts have examined the source of a
challenged restraint-i.e., whether it originated from the manufacturer,
in which case it is regarded as vertical, or the distributors, in which case
it is regarded as horizontal.
We now turn to the cases analyzing dual distribution restraints, beginning with the ones that classify such restraints as horizontal and then
proceeding to those that view them as vertical.

IV. HORIZONTAL

CASES

A number of cases have characterized nonprice restraints imposed
by dual distributors as horizontal. Almost all of these cases, however,
were decided before Sylvania. Many of these cases spring from a
Supreme Court decision regarding the legality of resale price restraints.
That case, United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc.,6" represents the
only decision in which the Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether a reitraint associated with dual distribution is horizontal or vertical. McKesson manufactured its own line of drugs and, at the same
time, was the largest drug wholesaler in the United States. It distributed
its drugs directly to retailers and through independent wholesalers. McKesson also entered into "fair trade" agreements with wholesalers to fix
the resale price of its drugs.
The case was decided under the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts,
which exempted such agreements between manufacturers and distributors from the per se rule against vertical price fixing, but not those be68. 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
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tween firms "in competition" with each other. The Court held that the
agreements were horizontal because McKesson, as a dual distributor,
competed "at the same functional level" with each of the wholesalers
with whom it had agreements.69 Therefore, the statutory exemptions of
those Acts did not protect the agreements.
McKesson argued that its relationship with its independent distributors should be viewed as vertical-and, therefore, exempt from per se
illegality. While Justices Harlan, Frankfurter and Burton accepted this
view in their dissent,7 0 Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority,
stated:
[McKesson] ... urges that what would be illegal if done between competing independent wholesalers becomes legal if
done between an independent wholesaler and a competing
wholesaler who is also the manufacturer of the brand product.
This is so, appellee [McKesson] maintains, because in contracting with independent wholesalers it acted solely as a manufacturer selling to buyers rather than as a competitor of these
buyers. But the statutes provide no basis for sanctioning the
fiction of McKesson, the country's largest drug wholesaler, acting only as a manufacturer when it concludes "fair trade"
agreements with competing wholesalers. These were agree'71
ments "between wholesalers.
McKesson's relevance to the law of dual distribution may seem remote since: 1) the matter involved price restraints which are treated
harshly by the law even in a vertical context; 72 and 2) the case was an
exercise in statutory construction of an exemption repealed twenty years
later. Nevertheless, even the cases that characterize nonprice restraints
69. Id. at 313. As characterized by the Court: "the crucial inquiry is whether the contracting parties compete with each other. If they do, the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts do
not permit them to fix resale prices." Id.
70. See infra text accompanying notes 198-204.
71. Id. at 312. This cited passage demonstrates formalism at its extreme. In effect, Chief
Justice Warren stated that McKesson wore two hats-that of a manufacturer and that of a
wholesaler-and behaved in a radically different manner depending on which hat was being
worn. But as explained in supra text accompanying notes 56-64, this rationale fails for two
reasons. First, no matter which hat is being worn, McKesson's interest is the same-to gain
maximum interbrand revenues and profits. Second, given the first reason, McKesson has no
incentive to impose restrictions on independent wholesalers that will interfere with their mutual interests.
72. Some commentators argue that vertical price restraints should be governed by the rule
of reason. See 1983 Antitrust Developments, supra note 57, at 385 & n.8; Posner, The Next Step
in the Antitrust Treatment of RestrictedDistribution: PerSe Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REv.6, 814 (1981) [hereinafter Next Step]. Posner contends that the price/non-price distinction is "indefensible." Id. at 9.
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by dual distributors as horizontal rely on McKesson either directly or
indirectly by adopting its analytical framework. Thus, even though McKesson was a resale price maintenance case, it remains influential today
on the issue of how to characterize restrictions a manufacturer imposes
upon independent distributors. By focusing on the "functional level,"
the Court in McKesson, viewed the relationship between a dual distributor and its independent distributors as one between horizontal competitors rather than that of a complex vertical arrangement.
McKesson's formalistic approach to analyzing restrictions placed
upon distributors influenced almost all dual distribution cases decided
prior to Sylvania. For example, Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp.73 involved territorial and customer restraints and resale price maintenance
imposed by a camera manufacturer (Minolta) on its distributors. Dual
distribution issues arose from Minolta's competition with its distributors
in the sale of photographic equipment to retail dealers. The district court
found each of these distributional restraints to be per se violations of
section 1 of the Sherman Act.74
The primary issue in Interphoto was Minolta's customer allocation
system, by which Minolta reserved to itself the right to deal with United
States military exchanges. The court rejected Minolta's justification that
such accounts required special handling. The court took an especially
dim view of any practices emanating from the manufacturer which operated "coercively" on distributors or which interfered with their "unfettered discretion."'T7 In this light, the court's characterization of
Minolta's customer and territorial allocation system as horizontal is not
surprising.7 6
After Interphoto, courts routinely characterized dual distributors'
territorial allocation schemes as horizontal. For example, in Hobart
Brothers Co. v. Malcolm T Gilliland, Inc.,7 7 a welding manufacturer's
73. 295 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 417 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1969).
74. Id. at 719-20.
75. Interphoto, 259 F. Supp. at 719.
76. The Court in Interphoto was also heavily influenced by the presence of price-fixing
which it regarded as "infecting" the restraints to make them per se unlawful:
The Court, however, restates the established rule that, where vertical territorial
restraints are ancillary to price-fixing, or where the price-fixing is an integral part of
the distribution system, the price-fixing "infects" the distribution restrictions and
renders them per se unlawful.... Minolta's activities fall within this established rule
and are, therefore, per se unlawful even if the combination to divide territories is not
viewed as being horizontal in nature.
Id. at 720 n.4 (citing United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1967)).
In the presence of price-fixing, therefore, it does not matter what form-vertical or horizontal-the territorial restraints take.
77. 471 F.2d 894 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 923 (1973).
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distribution system involving areas of "primary responsibility"--certain
areas of which were reserved for itself-was condemned as a "horizontal

territorial allocation. '7 8 The territorial restriction's elimination of competition "between Hobart and its own distributors" obviously troubled
the Hobart court.7 9 While the court purported to base its decision upon
the economic realities of Hobart's arrangement, in fact, it simply incorrectly labeled Hobart's territorial scheme as horizontal.8 0
The courts' willingness to recognize horizontal problems with territorial restrictions imposed by dual distributors was extended in American
Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc.8 1 In Holiday Inns, the Third Circuit confronted a situation involving the denial of a franchisee's request
to open a Holiday Inn in Newark, New Jersey. The court ruled that the
franchisor's denial violated the Sherman Act because it was made pursuant to a horizontal market allocation system. 2 The division of territories
here had some additional distinguishing characteristics. Holiday Inns
was the franchisor for 1380 hotels in the United States, of which 1099
78. Id. at 899. The case arose when Gilliland, one of Hobart's distributors, began selling
outside his assigned territory. From Hobart's point of view, Gilliland's violations were nothing to trifle with since the exclusive selling area that was invaded was one the manufacturer
had reserved for itself. The relationship between Hobart and Gilliland was not the typical dual
distribution arrangement, however, because Gilliland was not merely a distributor. Gilliland
also manufactured and distributed a product similar to one Hobart produced. Thus, Hobart
and Gilliland were dual manufacturer-distributors. Despite this unusual feature, the court did
not rely on the fact that the two firms were in competition with each other at the manufacturing level to condemn the territorial restrictions. As the Fifth Circuit observed: "Hobart knew
from the beginning that Gilliland was constructing equipment that competed with Hobart's.
Hobart... was never concerned with this minor competition as long as Gilliland's actions
were compatible with the sale of Hobart products." Id. at 897.
79. Id. at 899.
80. Id. The Hobart court stated: "It is a per se violation of § 1 for competitors at the same
level of the market structure to allocate territories in order to minimize competition." Id.
(citing United States v. Topco Assocs. Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972)). But the Topco analogy is not
appropriate. Topco involved restraints imposed by trademark licensors owned and controlled
by their licensees. This horizontal market allocation hardly describes the situation in Hobart
where the distributors had no control over the allocation of distribution areas. The court in
Hobart got around the problem by equating the agreement to a horizontal one. "The Hobart
distribution agreement, while appearing to allocate territory vertically, in fact, resulted in a
horizontal territorial allocation between Hobart and its own distributors. Such an arrangement must be treated as it operated in practice rather than 'as arranged by skillful drafting.'"
Id. (citing Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964)). Ironically, disagreement exists
among scholars as to whether Topco was truly a horizontal, interbrand case. Compare Gerhart, supra note 57, at 325-27 with IntrabrandCartels,supra note 9, at 36-40. Even those who
apply economic analysis to these arrangements have a difficult time in cutting through the
horizontal/vertical interbrand/intrabrand jungle.
81. 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975).
82. Id. at 1253-54.
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were owned by independent parties.8 3 The franchise agreement specified
three types of restrictions. First, franchisees were prohibited from owning any hotel other than a Holiday Inn (the "non-Holiday Inn clause").84
Second, franchisees could not operate in areas where Holiday Innsowned hotels were located (the "company-town policy")." Third, even
if the first two restrictions were satisfied, existing franchisees could veto
the establishment of any new Holiday Inns in their immediate areas.8 6
The court ruled that the company-town policy, standing alone, was reasonable because it was imposed unilaterally by the franchisor.8 7 Also,
the non-Holiday Inn clause, standing alone, might be valid, but the combination of the company-town policy with the non-Holiday Inn clause
was fatal. That combination, according to the court, resulted in a "horizontal conspiracy" to divide territories between Holiday Inns operating
on the retail level as a motel-operator and its franchisees.8 8
Two features of the arrangement influenced the court. The first was
the veto power that existing franchisees held over a new entry:
By thus permitting its existing franchisees to determine
whether a potential competitor would be allowed to enter...
HI enabled its franchisees already in the.., area to divide that
market between themselves, thus precluding further intrabrand
competition. Such conduct constitutes a horizontal market allocation that is a violation of the Sherman Act.
HI's [the franchisor's] action in denying AMI's [the franchisee's] application, according to the trial court, was not taken
unilaterally, but rather in concert with one or more of its licensees. If HI had acted independently in refusing AMI's request,
such conduct might have been akin to the vertical restraints in
Schwinn. But where, as here, the action in question is ascertained by the finder of fact to be joint or collaborative, it is
sufficient to constitute a "combination or conspiracy" within
the meaning of the Sherman Act. 9
83. Id. at 1235.
84. Id. at 1238.
85. Id. at 1239-40.
86. Id. at 1242.
87. Id. at 1253.
88. Id. at 1253-54.
89. Id. at 1242-43 (citation omitted). The distinction the court made between independent
and joint action makes little sense from an economic viewpoint. Since both manufacturers'
and distributors' interests are advanced by an efficient distribution system, joint behavior to
maximize profits should not be presumed to be for anticompetitive purposes. See Intrabrand
Cartels,supra note 9, at 4-6 & n.18.
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The second distinguishing feature was that Holiday Inns owned 281
hotels which operated at the same functional level as its franchisees. Citing Hobart, McKesson and Interphoto as authority, the Third Circuit
stated:
Acts by a franchisor, such as HI, that create otherwise unreasonable restraints of trade are not insulated from the antitrust laws by the fact that such company functions as a
franchisor as well as a motel operator....
In the present case, since HI, in one of its capacities, was
dealing on the same market level as its franchisees, its contracts
that, in effect, foreclosed such franchisees from operating either
Holiday Inns or non-Holiday Inns in cities where HI operated
an inn, except with HI's permission, constitute market allocation agreements among competitors. 90
If neither the non-Holiday Inn clause nor the company-town policy
alone was objectionable, it is difficult to understand why the combination
of both policies was harmful. The court, however, was troubled by the
de facto veto power of nearby franchisees, which was similar to the "veto
of sorts" which nearby grocers exercised over new members in United
States v. Topco Associates.9 1 The court was also troubled because Holiday Inns "was dealing on the same market level as its franchisees. 9 2
Finally, the court was concerned by interactions between Holiday Inns
and its franchisees that looked like a "combination or conspiracy." Yet,
what the court was really attacking was a franchise system in which the
franchisor shared operational responsibilities with its franchisees. In effect, the presence of a system similar to that of dual distribution along
with joint decision-making powers were factors in transforming otherwise innocent conduct into illegal behavior.93
90. 521 F.2d at 1253-54.
91. Id. at 1242-43 (citing United States v. Topco Assocs. Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972)). Professor Baker has criticized this aspect of the Holiday Inns case. He stated that "[t]he right to
veto competing dealers looks suspiciously like an exclusive distributorship" which is treated as
per se legal by the courts. Baker, supra note 9, at 1509 n.159. Ironically, the court in Holiday
Inns acknowledged this analogy to the exclusive distributorship. See 521 F.2d at 1250.
92. Id. at 1254.
93. Holiday Inns was followed by and cited in Pitchford v. Pepi, Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3d
Cir.), cert denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976), which involved territorial restrictions imposed by a
manufacturer of scientific instruments who gradually replaced most of its dealers with its own
branches. The Third Circuit's analysis did not depart from Holiday Inns' formalistic mode:
In the present case, there is evidence that PEI [the manufacturer] responded to
branch and dealer complaints about sales made without regard to the territorial allocation and actively sought to prevent entry by one dealer into another dealer's territory.... In addition, the record reveals an explicit agreement between PEI and each
dealer to divide territories. Thus a horizontal restraint, aperse violation of the Sher-
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These "horizontal" cases were all decided before Sylvania at a time
when most vertical restraints were condemned by Schwinn. The distinction between vertical and horizontal restraints was for all practical purposes meaningless since the law treated both forms harshly. If a court
wrongly classified a vertical restraint as horizontal, no real harm was
done besides that inflicted on the state of legal craftsmanship. Perhaps
this explains why courts were so sloppy and inaccurate in their characterizations of nonprice restraints in dual distribution cases, even going so
far as to characterize obviously vertical restraints as "equivalent" to horizontal ones.94
After Sylvania, however, the courts generally viewed similar-if not
identical-restraints in a more favorable light.9" In pre-Sylvania cases, it
did not matter greatly how restraints imposed by dual distributors were
classified. But in cases decided after Sylvania, the legality of these restraints turned upon a determination of whether they were "vertical" or
"horizontal." Of course, it does not make sense that changes in the legal
standard governing nonprice restraints should alter the way courts characterize those restraints. Whether courts were confusing the legal standard with the characterization process or whether changes in the
prevailing standard influenced the characterization perception remains a
mystery.
The pre-Sylvania view of nonprice distribution restraints, however,
did not completely vanish after Sylvania. Two cases, in particular, decided shortly after Sylvania, illustrate how difficult it was for some courts
to shift their perception and how assiduously they clung to a mechanical
analytical approach. In Dougherty v. ContinentalOil Co.,96 the Fifth Circuit stated that territorial divisions of a dual distributor may still be
viewed as horizontal, although it acknowledged that such relationships
man Act, could be found on this record, even if the Schwinn prohibition of vertical
restraints were not dispositive.
Id. at 104 (citation omitted).
94. See, eg., United States v. CIBA GEIGY Corp., 508 F. Supp. 1118 (D.N.J. 1976).
CIBA GEIGY involved a drug manufacturer who sold a drug in bulk to other drug companies,
but restricted its resale to specific formulations the manufacturer was not marketing. The
court held:
Although these contracts were reached in a vertical, supplier-purchaser, context,
they, in fact, were designed to limit horizontal competition between CIBA and its
vendees....
Where it is shown, as it is here, that a vertically imposed restraint is intended to
suppress horizontal competition, the court will treat the agreement as the equivalent
of a horizontal restraint of trade.
Id. at 1146.
95. See infra text accompanying notes 107-93.
96. 579 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1978).
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contained vertical elements. Dougherty involved three methods of gasoline distribution by Conoco: sales to independent jobbers, direct sales to
consumers and consignments to commission agents. In dictum the Fifth
Circuit stated:
The relationship among the defendants has both vertical
and horizontal elements. Vertically, Conoco, as a manufacturer and seller of petroleum products, agreed with entities at a
lower level of the marketing chain, its jobbers, to sell them assets previously owned by Conoco. Horizontally, Conoco, as an
owner and operator of both bulk plants and retail service stations, agreed with entities at the same market level, its jobbers,
to sell them assets previously owned by Conoco. Thus, under
settled antitrust doctrines, the Conoco-jobber dealings are capable of several characterizations.
...
Entities in a seemingly vertical relationship may be
deemed capable of horizontal restraints if they are actual or potential competitors.... Thus since Conoco operated bulk facilities and retail stations at the same marketing level as the
jobbers, the arrangement theoretically could be given per se
97
treatment as a horizontal market allocation among them.

Despite citing Sylvania for authority, a California court adopted a
rigid horizontal analysis to a wine producer's territorial division arrangement. In Guild Wineries & Distilleries v. J.Sosnick & Son, 98 the wine
producer (Guild) established areas of primary responsibility for its
wholesale distributors. When one of the wholesalers began selling in an
area where Guild itself was distributing, Guild terminated that wholesaler. The California Court of Appeal ruled that the termination and
territorial allocations were illegal. 99 The court cited Topco, Holiday Inns
and Hobart to the effect that such arrangements constituted "horizontal
restraints." "It is settled that distributors cannot lawfully agree to divide
territories or customers."'1'0
The court distinguished Sylvania because it did not involve dual
distribution:
That case held that vertical, nonprice restraints by a manufacturer on distributors---e.g., manufacturer allocation of distributor territories-are not automatically unlawful but are to be
97. Id. at 958, 959 (citations omitted).
98. 102 Cal. App. 3d 627, 162 Cal. Rptr. 87 (1980).
99. Id. at 636-37, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 92-93.
100. Id. at 633, 162 Cal Rptr. at 91.

1300

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:1273

tested under the rule of reason, i.e., by looking at the economic
effects on competition. In that case,... [t]he manufacturer did

not compete with its distributors. Not only is the case factually
inapposite, but the court took pains to note that its decision did
not alter the rule as to horizontal restraints: "There may be
occasional problems in differentiating vertical restrictions from
horizontal restrictions originating in agreements among the retailers. There is no doubt that restrictions in the latter category
would be illegal per se [.],,o1
Guild Wineries, however, does not help us to distinguish horizontal
from vertical arrangements. It merely declares that territorial division
and customer allocation arrangements imposed by dual distributors are
to be treated as horizontal because dual distribution is involved. It thus
goes farther than any other case in declaring its hostility-when other
restraints are involved-to distribution by the manufacturer. Quoting
from another case, the Guild Wineries court stated:

When a distributor is replaced by another, the public is given a
substitute with no diminution in the number of distributors offering services, but when a manufacturer enters the field and
then removes a distributor, the public is left with only the man-

ufacturer instead of the manufacturer and the independent
distributor."° 2
Commenting on this passage, Professor Tyler Baker observed: "In

effect, cases of this kind make the manufacturer's decision to use independent distributors irrevocable."10°3 These cases also reflect an overt

hostility towards distribution by manufacturers. In effect, the manufacturer is given only two choices: either to rely on independent firms entirely for distribution or to completely vertically integrate. By
discouraging manufacturers from entering the distributional level in
competition with their independent distributors, cases such as Guild
101. Id. at 634-35, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 91-92 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
102. Id., 162 Cal. Rptr. at 91 (citing Industrial Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Interchemical Corp.,
437 F.2d 1336, 1342 (9th Cir. 1970)). This passage illustrates legal reasoning at its worst. It
ignores, for example, that vertically integrated firms such as Sears Roebuck & Co. do not offer
the public the opportunity to deal with an independent distributor for its goods and services.
If it is permissible for a firm to initially operate as Sears does, why is it wrong for a nonintegrated firm to change its mode of operation to an integrated one? As Professor Baker
observes: "There is no antitrust objection to a manufacturer providing its own distribution
from the beginning. Therefore, a rule penalizing him for making that decision after starting
with independent distributors is hardly likely to favor independent distributors over the long
run." Baker, supra note 9, at 1512. The court also seems to be confusing intrabrand with
interbrand competition.
103. Baker, supra note 9, at 1511 n.165.

June 1988]

DUAL DISTRIBUTION AND ANTITRUST LAW

1301

Wineries ironically discourage the presence of more competition at that
level.
The dissent focused on the majority's reasons for imposing distribution restrictions and stated that legality should not turn on how restrictions are labeled-horizontal or vertical--or their source-manufacturer
or distributor."Ic Nevertheless, while some recent decisions have
adopted the dissent's approach, Sylvania has not precluded courts from
condemning restrictions imposed by manufacturer-distributors as horizontal restraints which are thus illegal per se.10 5 Despite Sylvania, one
court declared as late as 1979: "Whether a restraint in a dual distribution system is viewed as horizontal or vertical is unsettled .... "106
V.

VERTICAL CASES

Altschuler, in his article on dual distribution, observed: "For the
most part, decisions supporting the vertical classification of dual distributional restraints share one telling characteristic: almost all of them have
appeared in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Sylvania."10 7
This is true even though Sylvania' 0 did not involve dual distribution.
The reason for the change in attitude is due primarily to Sylvania's more
favorable treatment of vertical restraints. Although this is irrelevant to
the issue of characterization, the change in legal treatment has appar104. See infra text accompanying notes 205-08. The primary objective of the restrictions
was to encourage retailers to engage in promotional presale services to assure the commercial
success of Guild's line of wines and to prevent free riding. 102 Cal. App. 3d at 638, 162 Cal.
Rptr. at 93-94. These are the same rationales the Supreme Court used in Sylvania to justify the
imposition of vertical restraints.
105. Lower court decisions have applied a horizontal analysis to restrictions associated with
dual distribution. For example, in Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., the district court
stated: "An entity occupying... a dual role [manufacturing and distribution] is forbidden per
se from imposing territorial market restrictions." 78 F.R.D. 108, 123 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
However, this conclusion was later rejected by the Ninth Circuit when it held that "dual
distribution systems must be evaluated under the traditional rule of reason standard" absent a
showing of "anti-competitive purpose or effect." Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664
F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1982). See Copy-Data Sys. v. Toshiba Am., Inc., 1979-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 62, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd, 663 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 474 U.S.
825 (1985) (district court found Toshiba's conduct to be per se violation; Second Circuit declined to apply per se rule recognizing that "territorial or customer restrictions in dual distribution systems affect only intrabrand competition"); see also Sherman v. British Leyland
Motors, Ltd., 601 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1979) (automobile manufacturer's reorganization of its
distribution system-which involved exchanging rights to distribute certain brands and establishment of exclusive territories between manufacturer's subsidiary and an independent distributor--could be deemed a horizontal agreement).
106. Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,806 at 78,704
(C.D. Cal. 1979), affid, 664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1982).
107. Altschuler, supra note 9, at 83.
108. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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ently altered the courts' perception on other issues. One would have
expected that Sylvania's rejection of a formalistic approach in favor of an
economic one would have led to a greater tendency to view distributional
restraints as benign and even to a tendency to forego the vertical-horizontal test. Although perceptions have changed somewhat, the analysis
of distribution issues remains essentially the same as that which prevailed
before Sylvania. As many of the cases next described illustrate, formalism still thrives post-Sylvania. While the legal results have changed, the
basis for many of the decisions have not. Indeed, many of the post-Sylvania decisions are no less formalistic than their pre-Sylvania counterparts.
Instead of engaging in an analysis of the likely economic effects, these
cases merely redefine the form at issue.
A. Formalistic Cases
One of the first cases decided after Sylvania was a Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) decision, In re Coca-Cola Co.,"°9 which challenged
territorial restrictions imposed by the famous supplier of syrup. CocaCola also became a bottler through the acquisition of some independent
bottlers. In the latter capacity, it operated in exclusive territories, along
with its independent bottlers. Citing the recently decided Sylvania decision, the commission noted that the rule of reason now governed supplier-imposed vertical territorial restrictions. 110 The commission then
took up the task of classifying Coca-Cola's exclusive territorial distribution system. In doing so, the commission revealed some misgivings with
the traditional approach used in classifying restraints:
Admittedly, the line which separates the "vertical" from the
"horizontal" forms of a geographic market allocation arrangement is not always as easy to distinguish as the market plane to
which they refer might tend to indicate. Both types of restraints at times may, at a given level of production or distribution, exhibit similar competitive characteristics which, on the
surface, obscure the firm or firms which are their true
source.... Consequently, only by ignoring the essential relationships which exist between the respondents and the independent bottlers might it be concluded that the restraints are
Topco-type "horizontal" market allocations based solely on the
fact that respondents operate bottling facilities and are thus potential competitors of the independents, and vice versa.'11
109. 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978), rev'd, 642 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See infra note 116.
110. 91 F.T.C. at 610.
111. Id. at 611 (citation and footnote omitted).
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In a footnote, the commission addressed the issues more directly.1 12
If Coca-Cola took over the bottling operation in a given territory by integrating vertically, the commission stated, "it would, of course, be entering the 'bottling level,' but we do not read Topco as condemning this type
of dual-distribution program as a horizontal market allocation arrangement."1 13 The commission concluded that while Coca-Cola's system had
horizontal aspects to it, they were not "predominant."1'14 Moreover,
Coca-Cola's restraints could not be considered horizontal "simply because they now prevent intrabrand competition among independents and
Coca-Cola's subsidiaries, whereas previously they functioned as a barrier
to intrabrand competition only among independents." '
Despite this
apparent appreciation of the nuances in Coca-Cola's distribution system,
the analytical framework the commission used was heavily formalistic,
employing a rigid horizontal-vertical test rather than focusing on the system's impact on interbrand competition.11 6
In the shadow of Sylvania, the FTC struggled to classify CocaCola's system. Other forums, however, had less trouble relying on formalistic shortcuts to come to their conclusions. H&B Equipment Co. v.
InternationalHarvesternI 7 illustrates such a formalistic shortcut. H&B
was a former distributor of Harvester and claimed that Harvester's establishment of a company store in direct competition with H&B, along with
distribution restrictions imposed on H&B, created a horizontal conspiracy between Harvester and its other distributors to force H&B out of
business. The Fifth Circuit disagreed with H&B, emphasizing the source
112. Id. at 613 n.14.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 614.
115. Id.
116. Although, the commission declined to apply the per se rule to Coca-Cola's territorial
restrictions, it nevertheless ruled that they were "unreasonable restraints on trade" when they
were analyzed under the rule of reason. Id. at 674. Thus, Coca-Cola's victory at the characterization stage was short-lived since the commission condemned its distribution system at the
rule of reason analysis stage. For a critique of the commission's handling of that second stage
of analysis, see Rule ofReason, supra note 44, at 6 (arguing that Coca-Cola imposed the system
of exclusive territories to encourage franchised bottlers to distibute to high-cost, low-volume
outlets in remote areas without losing the more profitable supermarket trade to free-riders). In
1980, Congress responded to the FTC's Coca-Cola litigation by passing the Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act which permits exclusive territories for soft drink distribution. 15
U.S.C. § 3501 (1982). Congress passed the Act to overturn the FTC decision and to protect
small independent bottlers. See 126 CONG. Rac. 17,713 (daily ed. June 28, 1980). After passage of the Act, upon petition of the soft-drink manufacturers, the court of appeals set aside
the commission's order on the ground that the Act was enacted to resolve the litigation. CocaCola, 642 F.2d at 1390-91. Thus, it took an act of Congress to preserve Coca-Cola's distribution system.
117. 577 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1978).

1304

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:1273

of the dual distribution plan: "Conspiracies between a manufacturer and
its distributors are only treated as horizontal, however, when the source
' 18
of the conspiracy is a combination of the distributors."

Citing Sylvania, the Fifth Circuit continued: "Here the asserted
originator of the plan to eliminate H&B was the manufacturer, which

allegedly established the company store for that purpose. Consequently,
antitrust law treats the conspiracy as a vertical restraint, and those re' 19
strictions are now judged under the rule of reason." "
In Westpoint Pepperell, Inc. v. Rea, 2 ' a dual distributor/manufacturer (Westpoint) transferred part of one distributor's territory to another distributor. Later, the distributor who lost these territorial rights

was terminated. The terminated distributor argued that Westpoint's sta-

tus as a dual distributor transformed its otherwise lawful exclusive distributorship agreement into a horizontal allocation of markets.
However, the court in Westpoint Pepperell declared that the territorial
restraints were vertical because Westpoint was not acting as a competitor
of its distributors when it established exclusive territories. 2 ' It found

cases that ruled similar restraints to be horizontal were distinguishable
manubecause they involved "territorial restraints which insulated the
with one another."' 122

facturer and distributor from competition
Although one might agree with the outcome of the latter two
cases-that the rule of reason rather than the per se rule should apply to

the challenged restrictions-these decisions are unsatisfactory in that
they result from application of a formalistic analysis. In H&B Equipment Co., the source of the restrictions was the determining factor; while
in Westpoint Pepperell, the outcome was still based on a labeling of the

restrictions.' 23 Although such factors are obviously relevant, they do not
118. Id. at 245.
119. Id. at 245-46. Although the result was different from that of the district court in H&B,
another district court employed a similar analysis in Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co.,
1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,806 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1982). At
issue was the legality of territorial restrictions imposed by an ice cream licensor who competed
on the distribution level with its own area franchisors/licensees. Id. at 78,702-03. As in H&B,
the source of the restriction was determinative. Since the restrictions came "from the top,"
with Baskin-Robbins acting as licensor and not as a competitor with its licensees, they were
viewed as vertical. The decision was upheld on slightly different grounds on appeal, Krehl v.
Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348. See infra text accompanying notes 209-215 for
an analysis of the appellate decision.
120. 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,341 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
121. Id. at 75,744.
122. Id. at 75,743. This statement makes little sense since exclusive territories alonewhich the court found to be legal-insulate exclusive distributors from intrabrand competition
of other distributors whether or not those "other" distributors include the manufacturer.
123. The court in Westpoint Pepperell also implicitly rejected the notion that a dual disti-
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constitute a completely satisfactory economic approach for deciding
legality.
B.

The Trend Away From Formalism-CasesIncorporatingEconomic
Analysis

Whether a restraint is vertical or horizontal and where a restraint
originated are relevant to any economic inquiry into the nature of a distributional restraint. But neither of these factors alone or together is sufficient to constitute an adequate analysis of the economic effects of a
challenged restraint as called for in Sylvania.' 24 Unfortunately, Sylvania
did little to assist courts in carrying out such an analysis. At the very
least, courts should try to determine the type of competition that is affected by any challenged restraint. Relevant questions include: 1)
whether the restraints enable firms to restrict output and raise price; 2)
whether they enhance efficiency; and 3) whether they promote or reduce
interbrand competition. Since Sylvania is concerned only with the impact upon interbrand competition, any restriction which affects only intrabrand competition or which has no adverse impact upon interbrand
competition should be governed by the rule of reason. An analysis that
merely attempts to assess the form or origin of a restraint does not go far
enough because it does not identify the "real" effects of the restraint. 125
In the relatively brief period since Sylvania was decided, some
courts have attempted to perform more than the usual simplistic analysis
based upon a subjective assessment of form or a search for the origin of a
restraint. For example, in Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire
Corp.,"2' 6 the district court rejected a challenge to a tire manufacturer/
distributor's system of restraints on horizontal grounds. Citing United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,27 the Rice court stated that restraints
which dual distributors impose on independent distributors are vertical
because their source is the manufacturer.'2 8 But the Rice court also
stated that whether the restraints in question were vertical or horizontal,
bution system somehow transforms otherwise innocent restrictions into per se violations of the
Sherman Act. Id. at 75,743-44.
124. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
125. See generallyIntrabrandCartels,supra note 9.
126. 483 F. Supp. 750 (D. Md. 1980), aff'd, 638 F.2d 15, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981).
127. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
128. Id. at 754 (citing United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)).
"Schwinn ... suggests that in a dual distribution system where the manufacturer is both supplier and competitor, the restraints imposed are to be evaluated as vertical because '[t]he
source of the restrictions is the manufacturer.'" Id.
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a per se approach was inappropriate.'2 9 A rule of reason analysis was
mandated, because the manufacturer-imposed
restraints were imple1 30
mented to promote interbrand competition.
On appeal, the result in Rice was affirmed, but the Fourth Circuit
disassociated itself with much of the lower court's reasoning.1 31 Specifically, the Fourth Circuit rejected the lower court's reliance on source as
a determining factor: "[w]e must reject, however, any implication...
that a restraint may always be regarded as vertical if it is imposed by the
manufacturer." 132 Instead of source, the court focused on the purpose of
the restraints.133 But in illustrating this point, the Fourth Circuit reverted to formalistic thinking:
Thus we think it is important to distinguish between a conspiracy among dealers and their supplying manufacturer for the
purpose of retail price maintenance that would benefit the dealers and one involving the same parties but redounding primarily to the benefit of the manufacturer as a result of increased
interbrand competition. A restraint imposed by the former
conspiracy would be horizontal in nature and per se illegal,
while one imposed by the latter would be vertical and analyzed
34
under the rule of reason.1
The flaws in the Fourth Circuit's reasoning center on: 1) its assumption that joint distribution agreements can benefit distributors or
manufacturers, but not both; 35 and 2) its acceptance of the formalistic
vertical-horizontal framework for characterizing restraints. The Fourth
Circuit, however, did redeem itself somewhat when it accepted the lower
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 638 F.2d 15, cert. denied, 454 U.S.
864 (1981).
132. Id. at 16.
133. Id. at 16-17.
134. Id. Unfortunately, the economic reasoning of the first clause of the first sentence is

flawed. Manufacturers usually impose retail price maintenance (RPM) for their own benefit or
the joint benefit of the manufacturer and its distributors. Moreover, despite its harsh treatment by the law, RPM can be and often is adopted for efficiency reasons. See RESALE PRICE
MAINTENANCE:

ECONOMIC THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE, FED. TRADE COMM.,

STAFF REPORT OF THE BUR. OF ECON. (Nov. 1983); Rule of Reason, supra note 44, at 3-4;

Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960).
135. See supra text accompanying note 63 for a critique of this assumption. Baker, supra
note 9, at 1492-93 n. 113 also points out that it is wrong to assume that a restriction is either
manufacturer or dealer imposed. It may result from some combination of the two. "There is,
however, no reason to believe that these polar positions exhaust the range of possibilities." Id.
Another flaw is the implication that resale price maintenance benefits the dealers, rather than
the manufacturer. See supra note 134.
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court's second rationale for applying a rule of reason standard because
"the restraints were for the purpose of promoting interbrand competition." 1 36 Thus, this case represents a blend of formalism and economic
analysis. On the one hand, it rejected characterizing restraints based
solely or; source and instead looked to the economic purpose of such
restraints. On the other hand, it utilized a vertical-horizontal demarcation and assumed that all joint behavior was collusive in nature.
Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp.137 was another
case that attempted to incorporate an economic analysis of the effects of
dual distribution. In Red Diamond, a distributor (Red Diamond) alleged
that a conspiracy existed between a manufacturer/distributor (Liquid)
and its three distributors to maintain territorial and customer restrictions
on sales of Liquid's products. The Fifth Circuit ruled that the restrictions were vertical in nature because their source was the manufacturer. 138 The Fifth Circuit also explained why the source was
determinative:
The reason for focusing on the source of restraints on distributors is economic. Distributors have an incentive to agree
among themselves to restrict competition, such as by allocating
territories, in order to raise the price they receive for their product because to do so normally increases their profits. Such a
horizontal conspiracy, which generates simply an increase in
prices, is generally detrimental to consumers and is illegal per
se.
Not only does a lorizontal conspiracy among distributors
hurt consumers, however; it injures the manufacturer as well
because the higher retail price of the product reduces the quantity sold at retail and hence the quantity demanded from the
manufacturer. A manufacturer generally prefers that its distributors sell its product for as low a price as possible, given the
price at which it sells the product to them, i.e., for as small a
markup as possible over the wholesale price, because its sales of
the products are normally greater the lower the retail price. A
manufacturer thus will typically encourage intrabrand competition in order to enhance interbrand competition, i.e., the com139
petitiveness of its product with those of other manufacturers.
136. Rice, 638 F.2d at 16-17.
137. 637 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir.), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981).
138. Id. at 1004 & n.4.
139. Id. at 1004 n.4 (citation omitted). The court's reasoning regarding dealer-initiated
restrictions is generally correct where they are implemented without the involvement of the
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The Red Diamond court then explained that a manufacturer's imposition
of restrictions on its distributors may increase interbrand competition:
Sometimes, however, a manufacturer will find it advantageous
to impose restrictions, such as assigned territories, on its distributors in order to induce them to undertake advertising or
promotional activities, to render more or better services to customers, or simply to push the product more vigorously. By facilitating such efforts on the part of distributors, the restrictions
tend to increase retail sales of the product, and may do so on
balance even if they also generate some increase in the price the
distributors charge. Thus, restrictions on intrabrand competition are sometimes a means whereby a manufacturer can increase interbrand competition. Because increasing interbrand
competition is generally socially desirable and because intrabrand restrictions are generally not socially harmful when
there is significant interbrand competition, manufacturer-imposed, i.e., vertical, restraints are governed by the rule of
reason. 140
Citing H&B Equipment Co. and Coca-Cola Co., the Red Diamond
court then rejected the notion that the presence of dual distribution
somehow infected these vertical restraints. In addition, the court suggested and offered an economic rationale for the practice:
That Liquid also distributed some of its own goods does
not alter the situation. When a producer elects to market its
goods through distributors, the latter are not, in an economic
sense, competitors of the producer even though the producer
also markets some of its goods itself; rather, the distributors are
"agents" of the producer, employed because the producer has
determined that it can supply its goods to consumers more efficiently by using distributors than it can by marketing them entirely by itself."'
In this important passage, the court rejected the legal community's conventional view that dual distributors compete with their independent dismanufacturer or supplier. The reasoning does not apply, however, where the manufacturer is
involved for reasons cited in supra note 63. Even where the manufacturer is not involved,
interbrand competition should constrain a dealer's price raising freedom. See also supra note
60.
140. Id. The only problem with this passage is the implication that a restriction desired or
imposed by dealers could not be adopted to enhance interbrand competition.
141. Id. at 1004-05 (citing H & B Equipment Co. v. International Harvester, 577 F.2d 239
(5th Cir. 1978) and In re Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978), rev'd, 642 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir.
1981)).
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tributors. Instead, the court recognized that dual distribution merely
represents one way by which a manufacturer markets its goods. Also
noteworthy is the decision's implied recognition of the mutuality of interest of the manufacturer and distributors in maximizing profits. The Fifth
Circuit ultimately found the restrictions legal under the rule of reason
because: 1) they did not harm, but instead improved interbrand competition and 2) to hold otherwise would have created an incentive for vertical
integration, thus eliminating independent distributors.14 2 Commenting
on the second rationale, the Fifth Circuit reasoned:
Liquid most probably could have chosen, consistent with the
antitrust laws, to do all of its own distributing.., either by
cancelling its distributors and expanding internally or by simply acquiring the distributors themselves. If Liquid had thus
vertically integrated into distributing, it clearly could have instructed its employees to abide by territorial and customer restrictions. And since Liquid could have accomplished these
ends by either internal expansion or merger, either of which
would have had an even greater impact on intrabrand competition, we fail to see why it would have been unreasonable
for
1 43
Liquid to accomplish the same ends by contract.
Red Diamond is thus distinctive for integrating economic insights
into a formalistic framework. While the basic approach depended heavily upon the conventional horizontal-vertical and source analysis, the
court attempted to examine the underlying purpose of the challenged restraints. Moreover, it recognized that while such restraints could restrict
intrabrand competition, at the same time they could enhance interbrand
competition.
Abadir & Co. v. FirstMississippi Corp., another Fifth Circuit case,
followed Red Diamond's reasoning. In Abadir, an agreement between a
fertilizer seller (First Mississippi) and an independent trader was held to
be vertical.145 The agreement limited the geographic area in which the
trader could resell urea purchased from First Mississippi. The distributor was permitted to resell only in Asia. First Mississippi was a dual
142. Id. at 1005-07.
143. Id. at 1006.07 (footnote omitted). This important passage points out a fatal flaw in
many distributional restraint decisions-the less favorable treatment accorded to contractual

integration as compared to ownership integration. While a vertically integrated firm controls
the price of its product, a non-integrated firm is forbidden by contract to have the same control
over the resale price. See Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 805 n.10 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1979).
144. 651 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1981).
145. Id. at 425.
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distributor because it also sold directly to customers. The Fifth Circuit
the disheld that Red Diamond controlled the legality issue and reversed
14 6
horizontal.
was
agreement
the
that
holding
trict court's
Abadir is interesting not because of its outcome, but because of the
rationale it offers for its outcome. The decision seems to reject a classification based on the source of the restriction:
A particular market-distributing agreement is treated as a
vertical agreement if the party imposing the agreement has the
potential economic advantages typically available to a supplier
in a vertical market-distributing agreement. If these potential
economic advantages are absent, then the agreement is
horizontal.
Thus, it is not decisive whether the party imposing the restriction is a manufacturer. A market-dividing agreement between manufacturers lacks legitimate potential economic
advantages, and would be subject to the per se horizontal rule
as readily as a horizontal agreement between distributors. But
a market-dividing agreement between non-manufacturers is
vertical if the party imposing the agreement has the potential
economic advantages typical of the supplier in a vertical market-distributing agreement.14 7
Despite this language, a footnote suggests that source is still important.
"Thus, vertical market-distributing agreements must truly be imposed by
a supplier, in fact. Market-distributing agreements which are initiated by
distributors are horizontal, even if the supplier is nominally a party to the
contract. ' 148 Moreover, the Abadir decision exudes less enthusiasm for
vertical restrictions where they are imposed by a dual distributor.
"[T]hose normal market factors encouraging a supplier to let its distributors compete are less effective to the extent that First Mississippi also
competes as a distributor." 4 9
Nevertheless, the court refused to apply a per se rule to the dual
distributorship merely because it contained horizontal elements. Citing
the Supreme Court's admonition in BroadcastMusic, Inc. v. Columbia
146. Id. at 424, 429.
147. Id. at 427 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The potential "economic advantages"
associated with vertical restrictions are those mentioned in Sylvania and Red Diamond-attracting competent and aggressive retailers, inducing retailers to engage in promotional activities, promoting market-distribution efficiency and maintaining control over safety and quality
of product.: Id. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-55; Red Diamond, 637 F.2d at 1004 n.4.
148. Id. at 427 n.5.
149. Id. at 427.
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BroadcastingSystems,"' that when applying per se rules "[1]iteralness is
overly simplistic and often overbroad,""' ' the Court held that the rule of
reason was the proper standard to apply to supplier or manufacturerimposed market divisions because such arrangements have the potential
to benefit interbrand competition. 52 "If economic analysis of this case
indicates anything, it indicates that agreements of this type have potential legitimate economic advantages, indicating that the rule of reason
should be applicable rather than a per se rule."' 3
Copy-Data Systems, Inc. v. Toshiba America, Inc.' 5 4 is a case that
represents an even greater break with the traditional formalistic approach. Copy-Data involved a manufacturer-distributor of office copying
equipment and one of its independent wholesalers, who enjoyed exclusive
territorial distribution rights that were gradually taken over by the manufacturer. The district court labeled the territorial restrictions "horizontal" and found them to be illegal per se. 156 Relying heavily onAbadir,
the Second Circuit reversed.
The district court stated that while Sylvania permitted manufacturers to impose territorial restrictions on independent distributors, this latitude did not apply where the manufacturer had its own distribution arm.
In the latter situation, the district court reasoned, the manufacturer is
not attempting to enhance its competitive position against other manufacturers, but is simply protecting itself from price competition from
other distributors.' 5 7 Thus, the district court's analysis differed little
from that of decisions decided prior to Sylvania.
The Second Circuit rejected the district court's formalistic analysis
on economic grounds. The court first noted that dual distributorships
contain both vertical and horizontal aspects and that numerous decisions
have split on the question of whether restrictions imposed by dual distributors are subject to per se or rule of reason analysis. The court then
stated that the per se rule does not apply in such circumstances. 5 8
The Second Circuit answered the district court's concern about the
150. 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979). See infra text accompanying notes 244-58 for a discussion of this
case.
151. Abadir, 651 F.2d at 426 (citing Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast Sys., 441
U.S. 1, 9 (1979)).
152. Id. at 428.
153. Id.
154. 663 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 825 (1985).
155. Id. at 408.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 408-11.
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manufacturer's capacity to restrict competition at the distributor level by
stating that the manufacturer "could gain nothing at the distributor level
by restricting competition in the intrabrand market."' s9 This is the primary implication of what in economics is known as the theory of successive monopoly. The manufacturer, in other words, cannot expand
whatever power it already has to increase prices or restrict output by
imposing territorial restrictions on its distributors." The Second Circuit implicitly recognized this theory in Copy-Data: "TAI [Toshiba
America, Inc.] could not increase the prices of its copiers at the distributor level without destroying whatever ability it had to compete successfully in the interbrand market which was dominated by Xerox and which
was being flooded by several new manufacturers ... ."161
Without speculating as to the precise goals of the manufacturer, the
court stated that the manufacturer may have had legitimate business reasons for imposing restrictions, such as assuring adequate after-sale service. 6 2 But the Second Circuit went one step further than any previous
case. Citing Professor Liebeler, the court declared: "[W]e recognize that
territorial or customer restrictions in dual distribution systems affect only
intrabrand competition."' 63
159. Id. at 410.
160. Only one maximum monopoly profit can be obtained in a vertical chain. A manufacturer acting as a monopolist cannot increase its profits by extending its power to the distribution level. Indeed, if the monopolist is already extracting monopoly profits at the
manufacturing level, it will want the distribution level to remain open and vigorously competitive. A second output restriction along the vertical chain would reduce profits for all participants including the monopolist. Thus, assuming a manufacturer wants to obtain maximum
profits, it can already do so at the manufacturing level without resorting to squeezing its independent distributors. The manufacturer's activities at the distribution level, therefore,
should not normally raise any antitrust concerns. This theory is valid, however, only where
the output is produced with fixed proportions of manufactured products and distribution services. See supra text accompanying notes 61-63.
161. 663 F.2d at 410.
162. Id. The Second Circuit explained how intrabrand distributor restrictions could enhance interbrand competition:
In this case, TAI was an insignificant force in the American market for copiers hoping to increase its market share primarily on the strength of a newly developed plain
paper copier. To be successful in this quest, TAI not only had to develop a product
the quality of which rivaled the offerings of industry giants Xerox and IBM, but also
had to assure the availability of prompt and skillful after-sale service on this technically sophisticated machine. The ability of distributors to handle the difficult servicing and maintenance problems associated with plain paper copiers would be of
utmost concern to all competent management personnel in companies in TAI's position. In these circumstances, TAI might well have had legitimate reasons, consistent
with antitrust law and policy, to restrict Copy-Data's freedom to market Toshiba
products.
Id.
163. Id. at 411 (citing W. LIEBELER, ANTITRUST ADvISOR § 2.20 (2d ed. Supp. 1980)).
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Thus, Copy-Data's contribution is two-fold: 1) it correctly distinguished between interbrand and intrabrand competition, noting that the
impact of a restriction on the former should be the court's only concern
and 2) it applied the theory of successive monopoly to the law of dual
distribution.
Copy-Data's recognition of the distinction between intrabrand and
interbrand competition was followed in Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service
Merchandise."' Service Merchandise involved a conflict between
Amana, a manufacturer of microwave ovens, and Service Merchandise, a
discount retail catalog chain. Service Merchandise objected to Amana's
distribution restrictions, which included the use of geographic, customer
and location restrictions that prevented distribution to discount retailers
such as itself. The legal dispute, however, involved more than Amana's
refusal to supply goods to discount dealers. Because Amana also happened to operate several distributorships, Service Merchandise challenged Amana's distributor restraints as constituting an illegal horizontal
market division. Instead of becoming immersed in a classification controversy, the Sixth Circuit simply stated that dual distributor restrictions
are analyzed by the rule of reason.1 65 In reaching its decision, the Sixth
Circuit was influenced by Amana's reasons for imposing these
restrictions:
Amana required of its distributors and authorized dealers that
they provide an acceptable level of required pre-sale, point-ofsale and post-sale services. Consistent with this marketing
strategy was Amana's need to eliminate any free riders from its
distribution chain. The restrictions were imposed to increase
interbrand competition within the microwave oven industry. 166
These reasons are similar to the potential economic advantages cited in
Abadir, and are typical of those usually mentioned to justify both price
and non-price vertical restraints.1 67
Service Merchandise also represented a clash between two different
styles of marketing. As described by the Sixth Circuit:
At issue in this case are two divergent marketing strategies. Amana's marketing strategy is aimed at enhancing interbrand competition whereas SMC's marketing strategy is aimed
at enhancing intrabrand competition. Amana markets its ovens
with a strategy of supplying. an oven plus services. SMC, on the
164.
165.
166.
167.

686 F.2d 1190 (6th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 466 U.S. 931 (1984).
Id. at 1196.
Id. at 1200 (footnote omitted).
See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-56.
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other hand, attempted
to market the ovens without supplying
16 8
services.
any
Even though Amana's restrictions reduced intrabrand competition, the
court applied the rule of reason because the restrictions "also had the
potential to promote interbrand competition via efficiencies in the distribution of the Amana product." 169 The efficiencies that the restrictions
encouraged included providing point-of-sale services and promotion, and
eliminating free riding by retailers such as Service Merchandise. The
court recognized the manufacturer's preference for an arrangement that
assured that its product would be distributed only when accompanied by
dealer-supplied services which would presumably enhance their value to
consumers.170 Had the court ruled otherwise, it would, for all practical
purposes, have condemned Amana's system of marketing as well as its
mode of distribution.
C. Recent Cases
Recent cases have reaffirmed this line of post-Sylvania, decisions
that treat restrictions imposed by dual distributors as vertical and/or
subject to the rule of reason. Thus, in Midwestern Waffles, Inc. v. Waffle
House, Inc.,1 71 where a franchisee challenged territorial restrictions imposed by a fast food franchisor who also operated company-owned restaurants, the court viewed the restraints as vertical and concluded that
the rule of reason should apply. The franchisee relied heavily on the fact
that Waffle House, which approved franchise territories, also operated
some of its own franchises. The court, however, refused to view the arrangement as a per se illegal horizontal market division. The district
court stated: "There is an emerging tendency by the courts to view the
primary relationship between a dual distributor and an independent franchisee as vertical where the restrictions do not lessen interbrand competi'172
tion or decrease the availability of goods or services."
In another antitrust matter, the court dismissed an attempt to characterize territorial restrictions imposed by a dual distributor as horizontal by observing: "The better-reasoned decisions have held that a rule of
173
reason analysis is applicable in dual distribution systems."
168. Service Merchandise, 686 F.2d at 1195.
169. Id. at 1200.
170. Id. at 1199-1200. A similar analysis was recently employed by the Supreme Court.
See Business Electronics v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 56 U.S.L.W. 4387 (U.S. May 3, 1988)
(No. 85-1910).
171. 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,567 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
172. Id. at 68,821.
173. Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldgs., Inc., 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,284,
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Another recent case, Graphic ProductsDistributorsv. Itek Corp.,
reaffirms the view that territorial restraints imposed by a dual distributor
are to be treated as vertical. 7 Itek is noteworthy because its analysis
recognizes that reductions on intrabrand competition can enhance the
welfare of consumers. The Itek court noted:
[A] vertical restraint on trade, almost by definition, involves
some reduction in intrabrand competition. When a manufacturer restricts a dealer to selling only within a certain territory,
or only to certain customers, or only from certain locations, it
is necessarily restraining intrabrand competition. However,
this may or may not have a negative effect on the welfare of the
consumer .... The effects of a restraint of intrabrand competition on consumer welfare cannot be viewed in isolation from
the interbrand market structure. A restriction of intrabrand
competition may-depending on the interbrand market structure--either enhance or diminish overall competition, and
hence consumer welfare. 176
While Itek distinguishes itself by focusing on consumer welfare, it
does note that restraints imposed by dual distributors present greater
competitive concerns than do restraints imposed by manufacturers who
do not compete with their distributors. Thus, even recent cases cannot
escape the position that dual distribution is to be viewed skeptically.
Two other cases, L. C. Williams Oil Co. v. Exxon Corp. 17 7 and
Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell,1 78 were correctly decided. However, in
their analysis, both courts struggled soulfully and seemed reluctant to
apply a rule of reason standard. In Williams, a gasoline distributor (Williams) sued its petroleum supplier (Exxon) for geographically restricting
the distributor's access to supply. Williams alleged that such restrictions
constituted a horizontal territorial restraint by a dual distributor since
Exxon also distributed directly to some service stations. The court ruled
that even if William's lack of access to certain Exxon terminals constituted a "territorial restraint"-which it later ruled it did not-the legalat 69,668 (E.D. Wis. 1983), aff'd, 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984).

Morton manufactured farm, commercial and industrial buildings. Jack Walters was one of
Morton's independent dealers. Over the years Morton terminated each of its dealers and gradually assumed distribution itself. Walters was the sole remaining Morton independent dealer
before he was terminated.
174. 717 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1983).
175. Id. at 1563-65.
176. Id. at 1571 (footnote omitted).
177. 625 F. Supp. 477 (M.D.N.C. 1985).
178. 803 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1986).
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179
ity of such a restraint would be determined under the rule of reason.
The court's analysis, nevertheless, was unduly narrow. First, it asserted
that a "neat distinction" existed between vertical and horizontal restraints. 8 0 Second, it blindly followed the United States v. GeneralMotors"' rule that a supplier-imposed restraint is governed by the per se
rule "if done at the horizontal competitors' [the supplier's dealers or distributors] insistence."' 82 Third, the court framed the crucial issue in formalistic terms: "The question thus arises whether Exxon was acting as a
supplier (in a vertical capacity) or as a competitor distributor (in a hori-

zontal capacity) when it allegedly limited William's territory."' 83
Rather than focusing on the economic impact of Exxon's distribution arrangements, the court fruitlessly attempted to determine which
aspect "predominated"-the vertical or horizontal corporate personality. "84
' In the end, the court essentially surrendered and declared that a
85
per se standard was not justified.'
The Ninth Circuit rendered an economically more sophisticated de179. Id. at 487.
180. Id.
181. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
182. Williams, 625 F. Supp. at 487. See supra text accompanying notes 52-64 for a critique
of the analysis underlying the distinction in the legal treatment of distributional restraints
based upon source.
183. Williams, 625 F. Supp. at 487. This language reflects a tenet of formalistic thinkingthat dual distributors are "competitors" with independent distributors-a premise that Red
Diamond rejected. 637 F.2d at 1005.
184. Excerpts from the opinion reflect an ambivalent and essentially incoherent attitude
toward supplier-imposed restraints where some of the distributors lobby for their imposition:
territorial restraints, made by suppliers acting at the insistence of competitors of a
claimant, are judged as per se illegal horizontal restraints despite the other (including
legitimate) goals the supplier may wish to achieve. In the instant case, Exxon also
has vertical and horizontal pressures for its territorial restraints-and yet its vertical
pressures are considered the predominant ones ....
...While horizontal competitors should be prevented from circumventing antitrust laws by having their supplier do their restraining, and while plaintiffs would
face difficulties attempting to disprove a supplier's contention that it was acting independently despite the horizontal competitors' pressures, a per se violation rule does
not seem justified in a situation in which a mixed motive is possible. While the horizontal competitors' influence "taints" the supplier's impartiality in imposing territorial restraints and thus perhaps justifies a presumption of unreasonableness, it does
not completely eliminate the supplier's ability to individually evaluate the situation.
Williams, 625 F. Supp. at 488-89.
185. The Williams opinion also stated:
It is arguable that plaintiffs in the present case should be given even more of the
benefit of the doubt in the current situation, in which both the vertical and horizontal
pressures emanate from the same corporate structure, making it more difficult to
discover which predominated. Nevertheless, the court is unwilling to find that a per
se illegality rule is appropriate here.
Id. at 489.
Professor Liebeler offered a possible explanation for such a puzzling outcome-although

June 1988]

DUAL DISTRIBUTION AND ANTITRUST LAW

1317

cision in Bell & Howell.186 Bell & Howell involved a manufacturer of

microfilm (Bell & Howell) who maintained its own service organizations
nationwide except for the southwestern United States, where it authorized an independent firm to service and distribute replacement parts.
The use of an independent distributor for part of the country thus made
Bell & Howell a dual distributor. Another independent service firm-

which previously was part of the Bell & Howell service organizationseized upon this fact as a basis for attacking the arrangement on antitrust
grounds when it could not obtain parts from Bell & Howell. 18 7 In rebuff-

ing the challenge to Bell & Howell's distribution scheme, the Ninth Circuit blended formalism with economic analysis. While justifying its
conclusion that the rule of reason applied on the basis of the traditional
vertical/horizontal framework, the court did not simply resort to legal

pigeonholing. Instead, it went on to explain:
[O]ne justification for rule of reason analysis of restrictions in
the context of a dual distributorship is that they provide corresponding benefits in the interbrand market. Because of the vertical element of the alleged "hybrid" agreement, the restriction

in the service market may well result in the same type of significant procompetitive effects in the product market as do restric-

tions in the context of a dual distributorship. 88
The Ninth Circuit also explicitly rejected Guild Wineries & Distilleries v. J. Sosnick & Son,18 9 one of the leading horizontal dual distribution
cases, as "flawed." 190 The court noted that: "Although a manufacturer's relationship with its distributors has an horizontal aspect when it
he was not referring specifically to this case-in view of the court's finding that horizontal
factors were present.
A standard based on form, however, tends to dissolve when the arrangement that it
makes illegal per se creates significant efficiencies. Many courts are reluctant to
strike down transactions that are obviously wealth producing. When confronted
with efficiency creating arrangements they will often try to avoid holding them illegal
per se.

1983 Antitrust Developments, supra note 57, at 386 (footnotes omitted).
186. 803 F.2d 1473.
187. Bell & Howell's policy was to supply replacement parts only to its own service organization or directly to owner users. With the exception of one authorized independent service
firm in the southwestern United States, Bell & Howell refused to supply replacements parts to
independent service organizations.
188. Bell & Howell, 803 F.2d at 1481 (citation omitted).
189. 102 Cal. App. 3d 627, 162 Cal. Rptr. 87 (1980).
190. Bell & Howell, 803 F.2d at 1482. The court's rejection of the Guild Wineries analysis
was especially strong:
The court in Guild Wineries decided that a distributor's termination in the context of
a dual distributorship arrangement should be judged by per se principles. It concluded that when a maiiufacturer "became a distributor," its relationship with its
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acts as a distributor itself, it remains primarily a vertical relationship. A
manufacturer retains some right to place restraints on its distributors to
improve its ability to compete in the product market."

'

Despite demonstrating some economic sensitivity, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Bell & Howell was still based on a horizontal/vertical
labeling framework. Moreover, the court's adherence to this framework

caused it to incorrectly label Bell & Howell's service relationship with its
southwestern distributor-servicer as "horizontal," 1 92 making the overall
relationship a "hybrid" one "composed of both a dual distributorship
and a horizontal relationship."' 9 3

The vertical cases described above reflect an evolution that, from the
perspective of economic analysis, is going in the right direction. But even

the best of these decisions still considers dual distribution a suspect practice when it is accompanied by restrictions on the freedom of independ-

ent distributors. In the next section of this Article, three decisions are
discussed which carry the evolution one step further. Unlike the opin-

ions discussed up to this point, the next three do not allow the presence
of dual distribution to color their analysis. Instead, they focus directly
on the challenged restraints' competitive impact.
fellow distributors was horizontal, and it lost the right to dictate territorial divisions
to a "fellow distributor." We suggest the analysis in Guild Wineries is flawed....
The approach of the Guild Wineries court appears to mischaracterize the dual
distributorship arrangement .....
Id. (citations omitted).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1481-82. This classification labeling is odd. If Bell & Howell's relationship with
an independent distributor is "vertical" for the purposes of the product market (replacement
parts distribution), it should not be any different for the service market. Perhaps the court was
confused by the lack of terminology to describe the service component of the arrangement. I
suggest that it be termed a "dual servicer" relationship.
193. Id. at 1481. In a footnote the court distinguished between "hybrid" relationships involving the same and different products or service markets. The footnote explained:
We note that a "hybrid" arrangement only justifies the application of the rule of
reason where the market in which the conspirators are in a vertical relationship is in
some way interdependent with the market in which they have a horizontal relationship. The fact that Conglomerate A supplies Conglomerate B with bread to sell in
B's retail stores almost certainly has nothing to do with A and B's ability to agree to
sell steel at the same price. The latter is still horizontal price-fixing and illegal per se.
Only when there is a possibility that the restraint in the market in which there is a
horizontal relationship will have significant procompetitive effects in the other market, as is the case when the markets are for the service and the distribution of the
same product, is rule of reason analysis appropriate.
Id. at 1482-83 n.6. See Hobart Bros. v. Malcolm T. Gilliland, Inc., 471 F.2d 894 (5th Cir.),
cerL denied, 412 U.S. 923 (1973), for another example of a "hybrid" relationship between a
supplier and distributor.
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INTEGRATING ECONOMIC ANALYSIS INTo
DUAL DISTRIBUTION LAW

By concentrating on the form of the distribution arrangement involved, most decisions fail to evaluate distribution restraints on the basis
' and
of economic effect. Copy-Data Systems v. Toshiba America, Inc. 94
Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp. ' are cases that succeed in analyzing substance over form, but do so within the traditional
vertical-horizontal framework. Thus, even these cases do not completely
escape the legacy of United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc.1 96 and the
influence of the traditional legal approach. It is difficult for most judges
to diverge from the traditional approach, not so much because they find
the approach compelling, but because it creates a convenient framework.
In law, once a framework is established, precedent makes it nearly impossible to successfully challenge conventional wisdom with a different
approach. 197 Little room exists for new insights when the preexisting
framework is incompatible. Despite the difficulties in incorporating economic analysis into the law of distributional restraints, the three follow-

ing opinions in particular go farther than most in applying a rational
economically-based analysis. Given the intellectual constraints of legal

analysis, it is not surprising to discover that two of the three opinions are
dissents.

McKesson, a dual distribution matter which had the added element
of resale price fixing under the fair trade laws, is the father of the "hori194. 663 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 825 (1985).
195. 637 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981).
196. 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
197. An example of the difficulty of incorporating new intellectual developments occurs in
first amendment law. The first amendment fully protects most "noncommercial" speech, but
accords only limited protection to "commercial" speech-speech that is related to commercial
advertising. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976). As with dual distribution, the relevant distinction is based on form, and as
with dual distribution, economists are highly critical. Economists do not believe that the commercial-noncommercial distinction is the proper way to analyze speech. Instead, they urge a
uniform approach for both forms of speech based upon whether the speech is susceptible to
useful regulation, i.e., permitting regulation only where the truth of the speech can be ascertained by regulators regardless of the type of speech involved. But such an approach is impossible as long as courts cling to the judge-made distinction between commercial and
noncommercial speech. See Coase, The Economics of the FirstAmendment: The Market for
Goods and The Marketfor Ideas, 64 AM. ECON. Rnv. 384 (1974); Coase, Advertising and Free
Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1977). The commercial speech doctrine and the traditional legal
approach to first amendment issues have also received scathing criticism from constitutional
scholars. See Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems,47 IND. L. J. 1
(1971); Jackson & Jeffries, CommercialSpeech. Economic Due Process and the FirstAmendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1 (1979).

0
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zontal" cases.19 At the time of that case, manufacturers were permitted

to set their distributors' resale prices so long as they did not compete
with their distributors. McKesson, however, was a dual distributor.
Therefore, the Court held that McKesson was not permitted to set resale
prices with "competing" wholesalers. In a sharp dissent, Justice Harlan
criticized the majority for basing its decision on form rather than on economic reality. Justice Harlan then analyzed the economics of McKesson's system. Justice Harlan stated that no real difference existed
between manufacturers who act as distributors and those who do not.
Using their price setting policies as an illustration, Justice Harlan stated:
[T]here is no meaningful distinction between the fair-trade contracts of integrated and non-integrated manufacturers.... In
both cases price competition in the resale of the branded product is eliminated, and in neither case does the price fixing extend beyond the manufacturer's own product. While the
Government concedes the right of a non-integrated manufacturer to eliminate price competition in his products between
wholesalers, it finds a vice not contemplated by the Acts when
one of the "wholesalers" is also the manufacturer, for then the
contracts eliminate competition between the very parties to the
contracts. But, in either case, all price competition is eliminated, and I am unable to see what difference it makes between
whom the eliminated competition would have existed had it not
been eliminated.1 99

Justice Harlan's view that the legality of an arrangement or restriction should not depend on the degree of integration of the supplier was
sophisticated for its time. His insight was echoed twenty-five years later
in the Red Diamond case." ° Unfortunately, most decisions today still do
not grasp this basic point. Justice Harlan next responded to the majority's argument that since McKesson was a wholesaler and a manufacturer, it was acting in competition with its independent wholesalers.
This verbalist argument can be answered by the equally verbalist one that the fair-trade contracts, being made in connection
with the sale of its own branded products, were made by McKesson in its capacity as a "manufacturer" rather than as a
competing "wholesaler." Neither argument being more conclusive than the other, the answer to the problem can be found
198. 351 U.S. 305. See supra text accompanying notes 68-72 for a discussion of the majority opinion of this case.
199. McKesson, 351 U.S. at 318 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
200. See supra text accompanying note 143.
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only by looking to the purpose of the provisos [of the MillerTydings and McGuire Acts] and its relation to the basic policy
of permitting resale price maintenance of branded goods.20 1
While this issue arose from an interpretation of the Miller-Tydings and
McGuire Acts, it is similar to an issue often litigated in dual distribution
cases-whether the restrictions originate from a manufacturer acting as a
manufacturer or as a wholesaler. Justice Harlan's dissent recognizes this
legal identity crisis as a false issue. Instead, the courts should focus on
the purpose and effect of such restrictions. That is, they should focus on
whether the restrictions in question affect interbrand or intrabrand
competition.2 °2
In interpreting the Acts, Justice Harlan stated that their "very purpose... is to permit a manufacturer to set the resale price for his own
products while preserving competition between brands-that is, between
the fair-traded item and similar items produced by other manufacturers." 2 "3 But virtually the same thing can be said about the purpose of the
antitrust laws regarding nonprice vertical restraints-to permit a manufacturer discretion in distributing its products while preserving competition between different brands. Twenty-one years after McKesson, the
Supreme Court concluded that because restraints imposed by the manufacturer for its own products could enable the manufacturer to compete
more effectively against other brands, their imposition was consistent
with the primary concern of the antitrust laws-to promote interbrand
competition. Perhaps the seeds of the Supreme Court's rationale in Sylvania were planted two decades earlier in Justice Harlan's discussion of
the purposes behind the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts in McKesson.
Justice Harlan's dissent argued:
The vice of price-fixing agreements between those in competition with each other, whether at the manufacturing, wholesaling, or retailing level, is that they can be utilized to eliminate
competition between brands.... I conclude that an integrated
manufacturer selling its products under fair-trade contracts to
independent wholesalers should be deemed to be acting as a
"manufacturer" rather than as a "wholesaler." 2'
201. 351 U.S. at 319 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
202. While some dealer cartels may be of antitrust significance because they are organized

to restrict output, see infra note 208, most of those cartels in practice will present no concern
simply because it is improbable that the manufacturer will go along with an arrangement that
will eiiher reduce its profits or transfer some of them to the dealers. See IntrabrandCartels,

supra note 9, at 35-36.
203. 351 U.S. at 317 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
204. 351 U.S. at 319-20 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Justice Harlan could
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In Guild Wineries & Distilleriesv. J. Sosnick & Son25 a California
Court of Appeal condemned a wine producer's territorial and customer
allocation agreements with its distributors as a "horizontal restraint"
where the producer also distributed its own product. Associate Justice
Christian dissented citing Sylvania's call to "assess the intent, competitive impact, and demonstrable economic effect of a nonprice distribution
restriction before declaring the restraint to be prohibited by the antitrust
laws." ' 6 Justice Christian's dissent is noteworthy for two reasons.
First, his opinion eschews formalism, explicitly rejecting the horizontalvertical framework most courts had adopted. Justice Christian
contended:
In the instant case, Guild was both a producer and a distributor
of wine, and also used independent wholesale distributors.
Whether nonprice distribution restrictions in such a dual distribution system are to be examined under the rule of reason or
under the per se doctrine should not turn on whether the restrictions are pigeonholed as horizontal or vertical. This is the
type of "formalistic line drawing" condemned in Sylvania.2" 7
Second, having dispensed with the horizontal-vertical distinction,
Justice Christian attacked another basis most courts, including Sylvania,
use to determine the appropriate legal standard of per se versus rule of
reason-whether the manufacturer or the retailers initiated the restrictions. To Justice Christian, this distinction was merely another version
of the artificial horizontal-vertical distinction. His dissent continued:
Whether distribution restrictions are to be examined under the
rule of reason or under the per se doctrine should not turn on
whether the restrictions were imposed by the manufacturer or
by downstream distributors.... As Professor Posner points
out: "Dealers as well as the manufacturer are hurt by free-riding; it is a detail whether the initiative in seeking to prevent
free-riding was taken by the dealers or the manufacturer. ' 20 8
still have done a better job by explaining why a manufacturer would want to impose resale
price maintenance--e.g., to prevent free-riding at the distribution level-and why such a practice posed no antitrust concern. The reason is that resale price maintenance could not increase
the manufacturer's market power beyond that which it already possessed.
205. 102 Cal. App. 3d 627, 162 Cal. Rptr. 87 (1980). See supra text accompanying notes
98-103 for a discussion of the majority opinion in this case.
206. 102 Cal. App. 3d at 645, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 98 (Christian, J., dissenting).
207. Id. (Christian, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 644, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 97-98 (Christian, J., dissenting). Posner, however, recognizes that the dealers' incentives may, at times, depart from those of the manufacturer. In
such circumstances, dealers may seek to restrict intrabrand competition to a greater extent
than the level desired by the manufacturer. Leaving aside the fact that the dealers may hurt
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Justice Christian's dissent thus analyzes distribution restraints on economic grounds where Justice Harlan's dissent and Sylvania left off. It
represents perhaps the most far reaching rejection of form in evaluating
the legality of vertical restraints.
The third contribution to an economic approach to these problems
comes from the Ninth Circuit appellate decision in Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co.20 9 The court adjudged Baskin-Robbins' three-tiered
marketing system legal.2 1 The Baskin-Robbins marketing system involved licensing other ice cream manufacturers, imposing territorial restrictions and reserving some territories to Baskin-Robbins. 2" The Krehl
opinion is notable for three reasons. First, it greatly emphasized the
"primary concern" of antitrust law-the promotion of interbrand competition-rather than the form of such restraints. In a revolutionary
manner, the Krehl court rejected the illusory test some other courts had
used, stating: "[O]ur inquiry focuses not on whether the vertical or horizontal aspects of the system predominate, but rather, on the actual competitive impact of the dual distribution system employed by Baskinthemselves if they do this-that is, if they restrict output beyond the level required for joint
manufacturer-dealer profit maximizing-if Posner is correct, some dealer cartels may be assembled to achieve anticompetitive objectives.
Even though a dealer cartel is usually no worse than a supplier monopoly, this fact is
hardly a count in its favor. Intrabrand dealer cartels, however, do not merit per se treatment
because such treatment assumes that all such cartels are bad. In other words, even if we reject
the view propounded by some that the source of a restriction does not matteTr, no case can be
made that per se treatment is appropriate. For if some intrabrand dealer cartels are good while
others are bad, the rule of reason standard is called for to distinguish between them. A simplistic formalistic analysis, however, glosses over these nuances and simply concludes that all
such cartels are bad because they are "horizontal." One commentator, on the other hand,
believes that all such cartels involving the suppliershould be permitted. See IntrabrandCartels,
supra note 9, at 26. See also supra note 63. Liebeler also stated:
[A]s a practical matter it is impossible to distinguish these conflicting purposes objectively. The practical alternatives are either to permit all restrictions that are
prompted by joint reseller activity, or to proscribe them. Since these restrictions will
sometimes increase efficiency and will never (given joint profit maximizing behavior)
decrease output, we should permit them in all cases.
IntrabrandCartels,supra note 9, at 26 n.76. Whether or not one agrees with this thesis, given
that (1) intrabrand dealer cartels involving the supplier will not decrease output, and (2) such
cartels can increase efficiency, a per se or "horizontal" standard is inappropriate.
209. See supra note 22 and Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348 (9th
Cir. 1982). The lower court decisions in this matter are discussed at supra notes 105 and 119.
210. Krehl, 664 F.2d at 1358.
211. The Baskin-Robbins marketing system was comprised of three tiers. At the top, it
managed the franchise and selected "area franchisors" who operated at the second level. The
area franchisors were independent manufacturers licensed by Baskin-Robbins to manufacture
ice cream and to establish and service franchised stores within exclusive territories. BaskinRobbins also operated at this level as an area franchisor in six exclusive territories. At the
third level were the retail franchised stores that sold Baskin-Robbins ice cream products to the
public. Id. at 1350-51.
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Robbins." 21' 2 Krehl also explained how restrictions on distributors could

actually enhance interbrand competition-a view not widely shared in
dual distribution cases.213
Second, Krehl endorsed the idea that courts should not interfere
with a manufacturer's distribution system absent evidence of harm to
interbrand competition.

[M]odern economic thought indicates that the invalidation of a
distribution system, absent a showing'of anti-competitive effect,

may actually retard competition. "Competition is promoted
when manufacturers are given wide latitude in establishing

their method of distribution and in choosing particular distributors. Judicial deference to the manufacturer's business judgment is grounded in large part on the assumption that the

manufacturer's interest in minimum distribution costs will benefit the consumer."2' 14
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Krehl attached no stigma to
the presence of dual distribution. This third contribution is really a logical extension of the first two. Krehl concluded:
It is evident that were BRICO to abandon its area franchisor
responsibilities, the system here would be identical to that involved in GTE Sylvania. We do not believe that BRICO's decision to retain these responsibilities in certain areas has any
significant effect on competition. Regardless of BRICO's decision, there would still be fourteen areas, each exclusively served
by a single manufacturer-franchisor. Only the identity of the
franchisor in a given area is affected by BRICO's decision to
212. 664 F.2d at 1356. The lower court laid the groundwork for this approach by stating
that the legality of a restraint in a dual distribution system may be determined by either of two
approaches: (1) by resolving the factual question of whether an arrangement is vertical or
horizontal as the FTC did in Coca Cola; or (2) by viewing a dual distribution system as a
separate business pattern and determining whether it should be subject to the per se rule because it results in anticompetitive interbrand effects. Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co.,
1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCII) 62,806 at 78,704 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir.
1982).
213. The Ninth Circuit stated:
Indeed, it appears that the distribution system at issue here may have actually fostered interbrand competition. Through the exclusive licensing of independent manufacturers, BRICO was able to expand into new geographic markets and promote the
wider availability of its products. This expansion allowed BRICO to grow from a
small manufacturer serving only local markets into a vigorous competitor with outlets throughout the world.
Krehl, 664 F.2d at 1356 (footnotes omitted).
214. Id. at 1356-57 (quoting A.H. Cox & Co. v. Star Mach. Co., 653 F.2d 1302, 1306 (9th,
Cir. 1981)).
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retain area franchisor responsibilities in certain territories. To
invalidate a distribution system on such basis is to revert to the
kind of "formalistic line drawing" eschewed by the Court in
GTE Sylvania.2 15
VII.

A

SUGGESTED APPROACH TO THE CHARACTERIZATION

PROCESS BASED ON ECONOMIC EFFECTS

The previous sections have -described the evolution of the law of
dual distribution and associated nonprice restraints. The courts have
proceeded gradually, perhaps even glacially, in the direction of applying
economic factors in their decisions. But, as the cases analyzed previously
reveal, even the most enlightened opinions fall short of what an adequate
economic analysis requires. In this section, I attempt to provide some
guidance on how courts should approach this area of antitrust law.
First, I will summarize the major problems plaguing judicial and scholarly analysis in this area. Then, I will describe the specific role that
courts play in dual distribution cases. Next, I will highlight the economic policy considerations that courts should consider in dual distribution cases. This will be followed by a description of the analytical
framework that courts should apply in these cases. Finally, I will apply
this framework to a factual situation derived from a case that was
wrongly decided.
A.

MajorAnalytical Problems in Dual DistributionCases

As previous sections of this Article have revealed, a long history
exists ofjudicial mishandling of the characterization analysis in dual distribution cases. This rudimentary, but crucial, analysis has been plagued
by confusion and a lack of coherent thinking. As Professor Gerhart
gloomily observed: "In all but the easiest cases, the determination
whether to apply the [per se] rule has been troublesome, largely because
few coherent, consistent standards have existed for making that
determination."2' 16
This confusion springs primarily from two sources: 1) the failure of
courts to properly distinguish between the two forms of competition at
issue-intrabrand and interbrand; and 2) the inability of courts and
scholars to recognize the potential efficiency enhancing aspects of the
215. Id. at 1356.
216. Gerhart, supra note 57, at 323. Professor Gerhart's observation pertained to antitrust
analysis generally, but is particularly appropriate for describing the state of analysis in dual
distribution cases.
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challenged arrangements. Courts, especially in dual distribution cases,
place undue emphasis on intrabrand competition, even though Sylvania
declared that interbrand competition is the "primary concern of antitrust
law."21' 7 This improper focus is exacerbated by the lack of recognition
given to potential beneficial effects of various distributional arrangements

and practices. The latter failure is due in part to a lack of understanding
of the purpose and function of various business arrangements. When
courts or scholars do not understand how or why a certain practice
works, they usually judge it on the basis of some type of formalistic
analysis.
The consequences of such confusion are serious. When courts fail to
correctly characterize distributional arrangements, some harmless arrangements-including some beneficial ones-may be improperly'
condemned.2 18
B.

The Court's Role in Dual Distribution Cases

The task in most dual distribution cases is two-fold. First, courts
must decide whether to apply the per se rule or the rule of reason to the
challenged practice. Second, if the challenged practice is not per se illegal, then courts must engage in a full-scale analysis of the competitive
effects of the practice.21 9 The first step, the characterization process, is
217. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977).
218. Judicial errors in characterizing distributional arrangements are biased against harmless arrangements. If a court incorrectly decides an arrangement is per se unlawful, there is no
opportunity, at the trial level, to correct the error. Erroneous decisions in the other direction-where the court states that the rule of reason standard applies when it should have found
that a per se standard applied--can be corrected when the rule of reason inquiry is actually
undertaken.
219. This Article is only concerned with the first step-the characterization analysis-since
that is the primary issue that is faced in dual distribution cases. The elements of a full fledged
rule of reason analysis are discussed in literature pertaining to all nonprice distributional restraints. See generally, Vertical Restrictions Limiting Intrabrand Competition, 1977 A.B.A.
SEC. ANTRusT L., MONOGRAPH 2, 53-71, [hereinafter ABA MONOGRAPH]; Rule of Reason,
supra note 44, at 14-20.
The first step is concerned mainly with an arrangement's "potential," while the second
step (the rule of reason balancing inquiry) is concerned with resolving whether the potential is
"actual." The analysis in the first step, therefore, is not and need not be as comprehensive as
that required in the second step of the rule of reason inquiry. Of primary concern is that the
court in a dual distribution case initially choose the appropriate legal standard to apply to the
arrangement. At this stage, we are not trying to determine the actual market effect of a distributional arrangement or nonprice restriction, although an agreement that is per se illegal is
one where actualmarket effect is conclusively presumed to be harmful. Nor are we conducting
.a full blown economic analysis as would be the case if we were at the second stage rule of
reason inquiry. Instead, we are concerned with whether a practice or arrangement is capable
of enhancing efficiency and, therefore, promoting consumer welfare, or whether it is capable
only of reducing interbrand competition and, therefore, harming consumer welfare.
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concerned with whether the challenged arrangement or restriction is per
se illegal. If it is, then no need exists to go to the second step; the second
step is required only if the rule of reason standard applies. Arrangements
that always-or almost always-tend to restrict competition are gov-

erned by the per se rule. Arrangements that sometimes restrict competition are governed by the rule of reason and their legality can only be
decided after a second stage balancing inquiry is completed.22 0

No matter which standard is eventually applied-the per se rule or
the rule of reason-an analysis of the challenged practice's potential

competitive and efficiency impact must first be made.2"' The decision to
apply the per se rule to an anticompetitive arrangement only signifies

that a second, more comprehensive analysis-a rule of reason balancing
inquiry-is avoided. 2 2 But application of the per se rule does not avoid
the necessity of first determining whether it should be applied. 2 3

The objective at the characterization stage is to distinguish between
those restrictions which are "automatically (per se) illegal" and "those
whose legality turn[s] on their market effects .... ,224 To achieve this
objective, the court must assess the likely effect of a challenged practice
or arrangement on interbrand competition and, therefore, on consumer

welfare. If done correctly, this inquiry will distinguish between those
arrangements which have no efficiency enhancing effects and those that
do.
220. Arrangements that never, or almost never, are anticompetitive are also governed by the
rule of reason, although a rule of reason balancing inquiry is unnecessary. These arrangements, really should be considered per se legal. See generally Next Step, supra note 72.
221. A comprehensive economic analysis at this stage is premature. All that is required is a
determination of whether a more complete economic analysis is needed. If one is needed, then
the rule of reason standard should govern the legality of the challenged arrangement or
restriction.
222. The recent literature on the rule of reason balancing test, however, takes a deeply
cynical view of the utility of the standard. For example, the American Bar Association complained of "[t]he lack of an accepted analytic structure." ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note
219, at 54. Further, Posner described the standard as one that "lacks content and so does not
provide guidance to judges, juries, or the Federal Trade Commission." Next Step, supra note
72, at 8. The literature also dismisses Justice Brandeis' classic formulation of the standard in
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), as being "exceedingly general,"
ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 219, at 53, and "not... helpful" for guiding courts. Rule of
Reason, supra note 44, at 15.
223. Professor Gerhart describes the task that courts must first undertake as follows: "no
decision to apply a per se rule can be made until after analysis, however rudimentary, of
whether the rule should be applied." Gerhart, supra note 57, at 323.
224. Liebeler, 1984 Economic Review ofAntitrust Developments: HorizontalRestrictions,Efficiency, and the Per Se Rule, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1019, 1026 (1986) [hereinafter 1984 Antitrust
Developments]. Arrangements that are per se illegal are also technically ones in which the
arrangements' illegality turns on their market effects. However, those effects are already
known by experience to be harmful.
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General Economic Considerationsat the CharacterizationStage
1. Consumer welfare model

From an economic perspective, the overriding goal of antitrust is to
maximize consumer welfare. 22 5 The mistake, however, of associating
consumer welfare exclusively with price competition must be avoided.
Under this naive view, consumer welfare is maximized by arrangements
that minimize the price consumers pay for a product. This view of consumer welfare is too narrow because consumers also benefit from nonprice or service competition. Indeed, firms often use vertical restraints to
achieve nonprice objectives-i.e., to assure that retailers provide adequate
services and promotion, to prevent other retailers from "free riding,"22 6
or to overcome supplier/distributor conflicts. Vertical restrictions on intrabrand competition that are necessary to provide additional services
may lead to higher prices for consumers, but can, nevertheless, enhance
consumer welfare when the value of these services is taken into
account.22 7
A more sophisticated economic model of consumer welfare recognizes that consumers are interested not only in low prices, but in a mix of
225. See Baker, supra note 9, at 1458. Baker states: "The organizing principle... is the
assumption that the proper function of the antitrust laws is to maximize consumer welfare by
enhancing and protecting competition. This is a powerful idea, capable of illuminating many
problems of antitrust analysis that have been perceived only dimly." Id. See also Gerhart,
supra note 57, at 321 ("a reorientation of substantive antitrust policy around the consumer
welfare model-was also endorsed by the... Supreme Court").
226. The free rider problem occurs when a full-service dealer loses sales to a nearby discounter who provides no services. Typically in these circumstances, consumers will go to the
full-service dealer for pre-purchase information and post-service warranty service, but make
their actual purchase from a discounter. The discounters, as well as the consumers, are taking
advantage of the full-service dealer. If such opportunistic behavior becomes widespread, eventually no distributors will provide consumers with information or service, and thus consumer
welfare will be diminished. The supplier who wants to assure that such information or services
are provided will impose restrictions on all dealers to eliminate free riding by the discounting
dealers. See also supra note 57 and infra notes 227 & 252.
227. One commentator explained this point as follows:
Virtually all of the justifications for vertical nonprice restrictions endorsed in
Sylvania assume an indirect effect on price. For example, the Court referred to
"market imperfections such as the so-called 'free rider' effect" that might discourage
retailers from providing the appropriate level of services. The same discounters that
provide the price competition favored by the enforcement agencies may also "free
ride" on the efforts of authorized dealers. A "free rider" takes advantage of a competitor's investment and charges a price lower than the competitor's, thereby
preventing the competitor from recouping its investment. The elimination of free
riders may encourage investment, but it also may increase prices. For this reason, a
rule condemning all vertical restrictions having an indirect effect on price is flatly
inconsistent with Sylvania.
Baker, supra note 9, at 1467 (citing Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977) (footnote omitted).
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price, quality, information and service. A restriction on distribution that
promotes consumer welfare, according to Posner, is one that gives consumers "their preferred mix of price and service.

' 228

The characteriza-

tion analysis, therefore, should recognize that trade-offs between price
and services are normal and do not necessarily adversely affect consumer
welfare.
2.

The "Primary Concern"-interbrand competition

In Sylvania, the Supreme Court made clear that consumer welfare is
correlated with the level and vitality of interbrandcompetition. Moreover, the BroadcastMusic Court explicitly recognized the important role
that efficiency plays in promoting interbrand competition. 2 29 Thus, when
we refer to arrangements that promote consumer welfare, we are talking
about those arrangements that increase efficiency and, therefore, enhance
interbrand competition.
In Sylvania, the Supreme Court made two important observations
that are consistent with this consumer welfare model. First, the Court
declared that antitrust law's "primary concern" is with interbrand competition, not intrabrand competition.230 Second, the Court stated that
"[t]he degree of intrabrand competition is wholly independent of the
level of interbrand competition confronting the manufacturer. '2 31 Taken
228. Next Step, supra note 72, at 20. Earlier in his article, Posner explained why the courts
should not prefer one form of competition (price) to that of another (nonprice):
[C]ompare two distribution systems, of manufacturers A and B respectively. A does
not impose any restrictions on the distribution of its product. As a result, its dealers
and distributors provide little or no information or other services with the product,
and its retail price is therefore low. B does impose restrictions; its dealers, therefore,
do provide extensive services, and the retail price of its product is higher. In which
distribution system is there more competition? In A's, because prices are lower, or in
B's, because services are greater? If competition is defined simply as rivalry, rather
than as a device for maximizing consumer welfare or economic efficiency, there is no
way to answer such questions, save by an arbitrary preference for price over service
competition, or for the reverse.... [A preference towards price competition] would
amount to saying, without any basis in fact or theory, that the services that restricted
distribution encourages are inherently less important-to the consumer, the courts,
or the framers of the Sherman Act-than the physical product with which the services are sold, even though the product may be worth much less to the customer
without the services than with them.
Id. at 19 (footnotes omitted).
229. In formulating a standard to characterize a distribution arrangement, the court looks
to see whether the arrangement was designed to "'increase economic efficiency and [thus]
render markets more, rather than less, competitive.'" Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcast Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 20 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S.
422, 441 n. 16 (1978)). In economic language, consumer welfare is enhanced "by increasing
" Gerhart, supra note 57, at 321.
productive and allocative efficiency ....
230. Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977).
231. Id. This part of footnote 19 receives much less attention than the oft-cited "primary
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together, these two ideas imply that so long as interbrand competition is
not adversely affected, a manufacturer should have substantial discretion
to impose restrictions on intrabrand competition. 232 A manufacturer
may restrict distribution to be more competitive with other manufacturers-i.e., to promote interbrand competition.23 3 A manufacturer may
also impose restrictions to provide consumers with a better mix of price
and service. A substantial reduction in intrabrand competition, therewith the promotion of interbrand competition
fore, is not inconsistent
234
welfare.
and consumer
Since the "primary concern" of antitrust law centers on interbrand
competition, considerations which do not focus on this particular form of
competition arguably are largely irrelevant. Thus, concerns about where
concern" language appearing earlier in the footnote. The Court goes on to explain why interbrand competition is the focus of its attention.
[ihere may be fierce intrabrand competition among the distributors of a product
produced by a monopolist and no intrabrand competition among the distributors of a
product produced by a firm in a highly competitive industry. But when interbrand
competition exists... it provides a significant check on the exploitation of intrabrand
market power because of the ability of consumers to substitute a different brand of
the same product.
Id
232. This is also implied by the Court's language in another footnote implicitly rejecting the
"least restrictive alternative." "The location restriction used by Sylvania was neither the least
nor the most restrictive provision that it could have used. But... a per se rule based on the
nature of the restriction is, in general, undesirable." Id at 58 n.29 (citation omitted). While
some commentators argue that a failure to use a lesser form of restriction should be per se
illegal, see, eg., Pitofsky, supra note 15, at 14, the ABA notes that "no court in a vertical
distribution case has ever held that the existence of less restrictive alternatives constitutes
proof of unreasonableness as a matter of fact and no court in a non-per se case has determined
the legitimacy of a restraint by examining the feasibility of alternatives." ABA MONOGRAPH,
supra note 219, at 59.
233. Posner put it more concisely: "economic theory... teaches that a manufacturer will
(unilaterally) restrict distribution only in order to be more competitive." Next Step, supra note
72, at 23. See also Baker, supra note 9, at 1511. Others argue that Posner's statement is valid
whether or not the restrictions are imposed "unilaterally." See IntrabrandCartels,supra note
9, at 5, 9.
234. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-55. Those who are troubled by reductions in intrabrand competition who, nevertheless, recognize that such reductions may be a necessary or lesser evil to
promote interbrand competitiveness, sometimes propose balancing the two forms of competition to resolve a restriction's legality at the rule of reason stage. In other words, they propose
weighing the loss in intrabrand competition with the gain in interbrand competition and basing
the legal outcome on which effect preponderates. Most scholars who have considered this test
have rejected it. See, eg., Next Step, supra note 72, at 8 (concluding that such a balancing is
"infeasible and unsound."). See also Intrabrand Cartels,supra note 9, at 3 n. 11; Pitofsky,
supra note 15 at 36; and Rule of Reason, supra note 44, at 16-17. However, a fair implication
of Sylvania is that measurement of such a tradeoff is proper. This implication represents dubious policy not so much because measuring such a tradeoff is infeasible, but because it is unsound. The proper tradeoff is not between intra and interbrand competition, but between
efficiency enhancing and output restricting effects on interbrand competition.

June 1988]

DUAL DISTRIBUTION AND ANTITRUST LAW

1331

a restriction originated,2 35 whether a supplier reserves certain territories
or customers for itself,2 36 whether restrictions merely "reduce" intrabrand competition or are "airtight" and thus eliminate it,2 37 or even
whether a restriction or arrangement is horizontal or vertical2 38 are misplaced. Such concerns only address the state of intrabrand competition,
without explaining how such intrabrand restrictions affect output, interbrand competition and consumer welfare.
That is not to suggest that these arrangements will never adversely
affect consumer welfare. But the law should not be quick to condemn
arrangements because at first blush they resemble a horizontal conspiracy. It is too easy to fall for such superficial appearances and to incorrectly apply a monopoly or anticompetitive explanation. The failure to
examine the likely effects of such arrangements may unnecessarily condemn arrangements that not only are not harmful, but are beneficial to
consumers.
Thus, under the consumer welfare standard, as well as the legal
standard articulated by the Court in Sylvania, a court's initial inquiry
should focus on how a practice or arrangement affects interbrand competition.2 39 The inquiry should be directed at assessing the potential of the
challenged practice or arrangement to either enhance or harm this form
of competition. Furthermore, the antitrust laws should never automatically penalize nor generally stand in the way of efficient arrangements or
restrictions that enhance efficiency. 24° The per se rule in particular
should be applied "only to arrangements that have a capacity to restrict
235. See, eg., Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 58 n.28; United States v. General Motors Corp., 384
U.S. 127 (1966); Baker, supra note 9, at 1519. But see supra text accompanying notes 52-64.
236. Compare Pitofsky, supra note 15, at 28 and ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 219, at 42
n.161 with Schwartz and Eisenstadt, supra note 2, at 71-73.
237. Compare Pitofsky, supra note 15, at 8-9, 27-29, 34, with Baker, supra note 9, at 151314. For three reasons, even complete elimination of intrabrand competition arguably should
not cause concern. First, the Court in Sylvania repeatedly intimated that interbrand competition is more important than intrabrand competition. Rule of Reason, supra note 44, at 10-11.
Second, as Liebeler stated, "[i]ntrabrand arrangements do not increase market share in and of
themselves." IntrabrandCartels, supra note 9, at 19 n.61. Third, complete elimination of
intrabrand competition also occurs as a result of vertical integration, which is considered legal.
Yet vertical restrictions are simply contractual substitutes for "what a vertically integrated
firm would achieve through internal command." Baker, supra note 9, at 1490. It does not
make sense to outlaw a restriction required by contract while tolerating the same restriction
which results from an ownership arrangement.
238. See IntrabrandCartels,supra note 9, at 8 & n.24.
239. 433 U.S. at 52 n.19 (this follows from the court's statement that such competition "is
the primary concern of antitrust law").
240. As Professor Hovenkamp eloquently stated: "[C]ondemnation of a vertical restraint
capable of substantial efficiencies is manifestly contrary to the consumer welfare principle."
Hovenkamp, supra note 3, at 1315.
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output without creating efficiency. ' 241
D. An Analytical Framework Based on Economic Effects
The typical dual distribution case involves a supplier who distributes
through wholly owned distributors, as well as through independent distributors, and imposes a number of territorial and customer restrictions
on both types of distributors. At the characterization stage, a court must
evaluate both the dual distribution arrangement itself and the restrictions
that are being challenged. Most of the time, the supplier imposes restrictions on the distributors-both independent and company-owned. However, since the restrictions are usually subject to negotiation by contract,
it can hardly be said that they are imposed "unilaterally." Nevertheless,
the restrictions sometimes are imposed or enforced at the request of one
or more of the distributors. The source of a restriction, as we have seen,
242
should not be determinative.
The legality of a dual distribution arrangement by itself-independent of any accompanying restraints on distribution-should almost never
be questioned.2 43 The manner in which a supplier distributes its product
should not raise any interbrand competitive concerns. In other words,
how a supplier distributes is a matter that should be left to the supplier's
discretion.
The restrictions that accompany a dual distribution arrangement
may raise independent concerns. How to characterize these restrictions
is something that has troubled courts and scholars for many years. In a
case decided two years after Sylvania, the Supreme Court formulated a
standard which is soundly based on consumer welfare principles. In
BroadcastMusic, Inc. v. Columbia BroadcastingSystem, 24 a case involving the legality of blanket licenses to copyright musical compositions, the
Court laid out a simple two-step test for characterizing conduct: 1)
whether a challenged restriction has the potential to increase efficiency;
241. 1984 Antitrust Developments, supra note 224, at 1019-20 (footnote omitted).
242. See supra text accompanying notes 52-64.
243. The following passage summarizes why dual distribution is regarded in a benign
manner:
The point is that dual distribution restrictions are pure intrabrand restrictions. They
can never involve a market share larger than that enjoyed by the manufacturer itself.
The fact that a manufacturer also operates some dealerships has no more effect on
generic market share than would be the case if the manufacturer operated none or all
of the reselling establishments.
IntrabrandCartels,supra note 9, at 50 (footnote omitted).
244. 441 U.S. 1 (1979). The analytical framework described here based on the Broadcast
Music standard was formulated by Professor Liebeler. It is exhaustively treated in 1983 Antitrust Developments, supra note 57.
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and 2) whether the challenged restriction increases the ability to restrict
output. Both inquiries are economic ones that force the court to determine the likely impact of an arrangement.2 4 5
Therefore, under the Broadcast Music standard, the appropriate inquiry is whether the arrangement or restriction has an efficiency creating
potential. In other words, is an arrangement's possible or likely effect to
be efficiency enhancing, and thus procompetitive? If so, the per se rule is
inappropriate. In the other extreme, if the only likely impact of an arrangement is to restrict output-and thus increase market power by itself-then the per se rule is appropriate. 246 The Broadcast Music test
only addresses these two extreme situations. However, for those situations where an arrangement involves a hybrid of the two extremes, or
involves neither, Professor Liebeler has argued that a proper characterization analysis must reject application of the per se rule since that rule
applies only when the restraint is certain to adversely affect competition. 247 Thus, where an arrangement has both output restricting and efficiency creating effects, a rule of reason inquiry is necessary to determine
which effect is preponderant. 24 8 If an arrangement has neither an efficiency creating potential nor an output restricting capacity, the arrangement is neutral as far as consumer welfare is concerned and probably
should raise no antitrust concern.
To summarize, the concern of antitrust law at the characterization
stage under this standard is with those arrangements which will restrict
output and which have no efficiency creating potential. In these circumstances, a per se rule is appropriate. But where the arrangements have a
legitimate efficiency enhancing potential, the per se rule is inappropriate.
Similarly, where the potential effect is neutral-neither output restricting
nor efficiency enhancing-the per se rule should not apply. Thus, at the
245. In outlining its standard for choosing the appropriate legal standard, the Court makes
clear that the inquiry is aimed at discovering the purpose as well as the likely effect of an
arrangement:
[I]n characterizing this conduct ... our inquiry must focus on whether the effect and,
here because it tends to show effect.., the purpose of the practice are to threaten the
proper operation of our predominantly free-market economy-that is, whether the
practice facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output ... or instead one designed to "increase economic efficiency and render markets more, rather than less, competitive."
441 U.S. at 19-20 (citations omitted).
246. More precisely, the per se rule applies only when the likely impact of an arrangement
or practice is to restrict output without creating any efficiencies.
247. ,1983 Antitrust Developments, supra note 57, at 394-95.
248. If an arrangement has anticompetitive as well as efficiency enhancing aspects, the per
se rule should not apply. However, if the anticompetitive aspect overwhelms the efficiency
effect, then the arrangement should be condemned under the rule of reason.
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characterization stage, courts should first determine in which pigeonhole
an arrangement fits.

A.

Output Restricting

C.

Capacity

B.

No Output Restricting
Capacity

No Efficiency Creation

No Efficiency Creation

Potential
Output Restricting

Potential
No Output Restricting

Capacity
Efficiency Creation

D.

Capacity
Efficiency Creation

Potential
Potential
Under the BroadcastMusic test, the rule of per se illegality is appropriate only for A; B must be handled by a rule of reason standard, while
C and especially D should be treated as per se legal.
To apply this test to a factual situation, one must be able to recog-

nize and distinguish between arrangements that are output restricting
and those that are efficiency creating. Unfortunately, economists disagree about the economic characteristics of output restricting arrangements since such tell-tale signs as increasing market share and increasing
market concentration may be a reflection of efficiency as well as output
restriction.249 It is somewhat easier to describe the characteristics associated with efficiency creation.
Efficiency creating arrangements include those that: 1) integrate
productive facilities or distributive efforts; 2) overcome an externality

such as a free rider problem; 3) reduce transaction costs; or 4) overcome
manufacturer/distributor incentive incompatibilities. 250 The first example involves a coordination of productive or distributive efforts of firms
249. See 1983 Antitrust Developments, supra note 57, at 403-04. See also Hovenkamp, supra
note 3, at 1305 n.56 & 1310-11. However, a number of situations and arrangements exist
where a per se rule can be confidently applied. For example, where a restrictive intrabrand
distribution system is used to reinforce a manufacturer cartel, the purpose of the arrangement
is not to acheive any efficiencies, but to restrict interbrand competition. 1983 Antitrust Developments, supra note 57, at 404-05. The same can be said for a different type of dealer cartel
than is discussed in this Article-an interbranddealer cartel. See Baker, supra note 9, at 1489;
1983 Antitrust Developments, supra note 57, at 405-06. However, such a cartel involving the
dealers of an entire product market, as opposed to intrabrand cartels which involve only the
dealers of a single manufacturer, is rare. Finally, those intrabranddealer cartels that do not
involve the supplier can safely be placed in the per se category. According to Liebeler, because
these cartels are without supplier participation, it is unlikely they are created for efficiency
reasons. See supra note 63.
250. The first three examples of efficiency effects are described in Gerhart, supra note 57, at
321-22, 334-44. For enlightened judicial discussions of the welfare implications of intrabrand
restraints, see Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001, 1004 n.4
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981); Copy-Data Sys., Inc. v. Toshiba Am., Inc., 663
F.2d 405, 410 (2d Cir. 1981), cerL denied, 474 U.S. 825 (1985).
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which leads to a more efficient output. The efficiency creating integration that was involved in and described by the Court in BroadcastMusic
was that "of sales, monitoring, and enforcement against unauthorized
copyright use."25' 1 The second example was specifically mentioned by
the Supreme Court in its Sylvania decision.25 2 Measures a manufacturer
takes against free riding create efficiencies by preventing opportunistic
behavior from disrupting its distribution system.25 3 The third example
refers to any arrangement that reduces the costs of transacting business.
It is related to the first example. To illustrate, the copyright license in
BroadcastMusic not only achieved an integration of legitimate market
activities--example 1-but also reduced bargaining and negotiating costs
which would be prohibitive if conducted on an individual basis.2 54 Finally, the fourth example refers to devices manufacturers employ to address the principal/agent problems that can arise with distributors or
dealers.25 5
In addition to these specific examples, a more general inquiry can be
made into the likely business purpose that an arrangement or restriction
serves. If done correctly, 2 56 such an inquiry can help us understand what
251. 441 U.S. at 20. See IntrabrandCartels,supra note 9, at 17-18; 1983 Antitrust Developments, supra note 57, at 400-02.
252. In Sylvania, the Court singled out the free rider effect and explained how nonprice
restrictions could ameliorate this problem:
[N]ew manufacturers and manufacturers entering new markets can use the restrictions in order to induce competent and aggressive retailers to make the kind of investment of capital and labor that is often required in the distribution of products
unknown to the consumer. Established manufacturers can use them to induce retailers to engage in promotional activities or to provide service and repair facilities necessary to the efficient marketing of their products. Service and repair are vital for
many products such as automobiles and major household appliances. The availability and quality of such services affect a manufacturer's goodwill and the competitiveness of his product. Because of market imperfections such as the so-called "free
rider" effect, these services might not be provided by retailers in a purely competitive
situation, despite the fact that each retailer's benefit would be greater if all provided
the services than if none did.
Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55. See also Business Electronics v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 56
U.S.L.W. 4387, 4390-91 (U.S. May 3, 1988) (No. 85-1910); Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merchandise, 686 F.2d 1190, 1195 n.8, 1200 (6th Cir. 1982), cerL denied, 466 U.S. 931 (1984).
253. See supra notes 57 and 226.
254. As the Broadcast Music Court recognized, "[i]ndividual sales transactions in this industry are quite expensive, as would be individual monitoring and enforcement, especially in
light of the resources of single composers." 441 U.S. at 20.
255. See supra note 8.
256. Both proponents and opponents of such an inquiry acknowledge that making such a
determination is not easy. ComparePitofsky, supra note 15, at 35 ("The primary problem with
evidence of purpose-to put the matter bluntly-is that in modem antitrust cases, such evidence will often reflect what counsel advise businessmen their purpose should have been."),
with 1983 Antitrust Developments, supra note 57, at 421 n.180 ("Application oftheperse rule
or the rule of reason does not depend on the skill of some lawyer in making an arrangement
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an arrangement's likely impact will be. For example, if the purpose of a
territorial restriction is to increase sales, the likely effect of its imposition
would be to enhance interbrand competition. Also, if the purpose of a
restriction is to reduce transaction costs, to prevent opportunistic behavior or to induce resellers to provide more services or information, then
the likely effect of the challenged arrangement is efficiency creating and
thus procompetitive. In any case, where the likely effect of a challenged
arrangement, restriction or practice is not readily apparent, courts
should attempt to objectively determine its business purpose.25 7
An inquiry into the purpose of an arrangement helps determine
what effect a restriction on intrabrand competition is likely to have. If it
will likely increase interbrand competition or increase efficiency, then the
per se rule cannot be applied under the BroadcastMusic test. Likewise, if
it will simultaneously produce anticompetitive and efficiency effects, the
per se rule cannot govern. 258 Perhaps at the next stage of inquiry-the
rule of reason balancing test-such "potential" efficiency creating effects
will prove to be ephemeral. Nevertheless, at the initial characterization
stage, the court should be reluctant to condemn arrangements that may
turn out to be welfare enhancing. Only if an arrangement has no potential to increase efficiency and will likely harm interbrand competition, is
the per se rule appropriate.
E.

The Analytical FrameworkApplied

The application of the framework described above can be illustrated
by reexamining a case that was incorrectly decided. A number of cases
reviewed in this Article were either wrongly decided or suffered from
inadequate judicial analysis, and thus could serve as candidates for illustrative purposes. No case, however, serves as a more flagrant example of
poor legal and economic reasoning than does Guild Wineries v. J. Sosnick
25 9

& Son.

Guild, it should be recalled, was a wine producer whose termination
of an independent wholesaler was successfully challenged under a state
look 'unique' or 'unfamiliar.' It depends on whether the arrangement has the potential to
increase efficiency or to restrict output. These factors cannot be manipulated by clever lawyers."). However, Liebeler does concede that it is impossible to distinguish between cartelization and efficiency enhancing purposes when dealers engage in cooperative activity.
IntrabrandCartels,supra note 9, at 5 n.18, 25 n.73, 26 n.76.
257. The inquiry should be objective, since subjective rationales by businessmen will often
be inaccurate and self-serving.
258. 1983 Antitrust Developments, supra note 57, at 394-96.
259. 102 Cal. App. 3d 627, 162 Cal. Rptr. 87 (1980). See supra text accompanying notes
98-104 and 205-08 for a discussion of this case.
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law patterned after the Sherman Act. 2" Prior to 1975, Guild distributed
its wines solely through independent wholesalers and assigned each of
them an area of primary responsibility, a mild form of territorial restriction. Dissatisfied with its market share overall, and particularly in one
geographic market-Fresno, California-Guild decided to take over
some of the distribution functions itself. In 1975, Guild took over the
wholesaling operation in the Fresno area. Shortly thereafter, one of
Guild's independent distributors, Sosnick, began serving a large grocery
chain in the Fresno area. When Sosnick refused to comply with Guild's
demands to cease operating in Guild's territory, Sosnick was terminated
as a distributor for Guild.2 61
Fixated with the notion that Guild's entry into the wholesaling level
transformed it into a horizontal competitor with its independent distributors, the majority in Guild Wineries held that the termination of Sosnick
was illegal.2 62 It ruled that Guild's efforts to enforce its territorial restrictions constituted a "horizontal restraint. '2 63 The restraint was "horizontal" precisely because Guild was a dual distributor. In other words,
a restraint that was "vertical" in 1974, magically became "horizontal" in
1975 when Guild decided to do some wholesaling of its own. Thus, the
very same restraint took on a different character depending on what kind
of supplier or who imposed it. Under the majority's reasoning, if the
restraint was imposed by a supplier who did no distributing, it was regarded as "vertical." However, if the restraint was enforced by a supplier who also acted as a distributor, it was "horizontal." The court
distinguished Sylvania because there the supplier, Sylvania, "did not
' 26
compete with its distributors.
Several facts, gleaned from the majority and dissenting opinions in
Guild Wineries, raise concerns about the decision. First, Guild entered
into the distribution field because it was alarmed by its overall low market share. In particular, Guild "wanted to increase its sales in the Fresno
area." 265 Second, Guild's executives testified that presale promotional
services were important to the commercial success of its wine line.
260. The Guild Wineries court noted that federal law interpreting the Sherman Act was
applicable to the Cartwright Act. 102 Cal. App. 3d 627, 633, 162 Cal. Rptr. 87, 90 (1980).
261. The case originally took the form of a breach of contract dispute. Guild brought action against Sosnick to recover monies due for liquor which Guild had sold to Sosnick. The
antitrust issue which dominated the case arose when Sosnick filed a cross-complaint alleging
violations of California's antitrust statute and seeking treble damages.
262. 102 Cal. App. 3d at 633, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 635, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
265. Id. at 631, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
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Third, Guild's distribution system was plagued by inadequate performance of this service function and by free riding. Fourth, one of the free
riders apparently was Sosnick who according to Guild "consistently refused to deliver promotional presale services to retail outlets .... "2I 6 Of
course, these "facts" may have proved false on further examination.
Nevertheless, they may reveal a possible reason for Guild's actions, and
provide clues to the possible effects of Guild's distributional arrangement. With these facts in mind, an analysis of Guild's arrangement is
now possible.
1. Entry by Guild into the distributional level
Entry by a manufacturer into the distributional level is a form of
vertical integration because the manufacturer extends his activity to a
different level of the chain of distribution.267 Such integration does not
harm interbrand competition and may be efficiency enhancing. Whether
a manufacturer distributes entirely by itself, or employs independent
firms for this function, or uses some combination of these two alternatives should not raise antitrust concerns. Further, consumer welfare is
promoted by granting suppliers freedom to choose the arrangement that
is most suitable to their circumstances. No reason exists to believe that
only one type of arrangement is optimal for all firms. In Guild Wineries,
no evidence indicated that Guild's entry into the distributional level was
for an anticompetitive purpose, such as to collude with fellow wine producers. Therefore, the fact that it became a dual distributor should not
by itself adversely affect the court's decision.
2. Guild's territorial restrictions
Applying the BroadcastMusic test, the first question is whether the
challenged arrangement has an efficiency creating potential. If it does
not, the next question is whether the arrangement would adversely affect
competition. Only if the answer to the first question is "no" and the
answer to the second is "yes" may the per se rule be applied with
confidence.
Here, no need exists to consider the second question. Guild's arrangement and accompanying restrictions were potentially efficiency enhancing. They were designed to encourage distributors to provide an
array of presale services that presumably would increase the value of
Guild's wine products to consumers-i.e., to provide consumers with the
266. Id. at 639, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 94 (Christian, J., dissenting).
267. That is, the manufacturer now performs a function-at a different level of the market-that was previously performed by an independent firm. See supra note 1.
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price/quality or price/service mix they preferred. They were also
designed to prevent free riding by opportunistic distributors who did not
provide such services and to align distributors' incentives with those of
the supplier. In short, both the arrangement as well as the termination of
Sosnick were consistent with the promotion of efficiency. "Removal of
free riders from the distribution system is the type of efficiency which the
Supreme Court approved in Sylvania; terminations achieving that end
should not be subjected to the per se rule."2 6
Assuming, however, that no efficiency creating potential was present, under the second test-i.e., whether the challenged practice adversely affects competition-the per se rule would be inappropriate
because it was not demonstrated that the arrangement would harm interbrand competition. Indeed, its very purpose was consistent with an effort
to expand sales rather than to restrict them. The testimony Guild's executives provided regarding the purpose behind the arrangement need not
be accepted at face value. It is enough at the characterization stage to
note that the arrangement is consistent with the procompetitive business
purpose of increasing sales.
Clearly, under these guildelines, Guild Wineries was wrongly decided. The testimony by Guild's executives was arguably self-serving
and some collusive scheme may have been secretly planned. If so, its
discovery and resolution should be made at the rule of reason inquiry.
Unfortunately, the formalistic approach the majority adopted in Guild
Wineries precluded the initiation of such an inquiry. Under an economically oriented approach which looks to the likely effects of an arrangement, no justification exists for treating an arrangement like Guild's as
one that would always, or almost always, restrict interbrand competition.
The arrangement is consistent with an efficiency enhancing rationale and
should not be condemned at the characterization stage. Moreover, as the
analysis just described illustrates, no need exists even to address the perplexing question as to whether the arrangement was horizontal or vertical. Instead, the focus should be on whether such an arrangement harms
or enhances consumer welfare.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Dual distribution is a perfectly legal method of marketing. However, when combined with other practices that limit the freedom of independent distributors or threaten their ability to compete, legal
problems arise. Courts resolve such problems today in basically the same
268. 1983 Antitrust Developments, supra note 57, at 413 (footnote omitted).
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manner as they have for decades-by engaging in an analytical process
known as the "characterization process" which focuses primarily on the

form such practices take. In legal controversies surrounding dual distribution, the outcome of the characterization process is often crucial to the
ultimate resolution of the matter. Yet the characterization process has
been subject to changing and often arbitrary judicial views, leading to
inconsistent decisions. This Article has argued that the law of dual dis-

tribution is flawed because of the courts' failure to follow the call of Sylvania269 to base decisions on economic effect rather than on formalistic
line drawing. This flaw is particularly troublesome because "antitrust

law is concerned not with superficial technical appearances, but with
practical economic substance."2 70

The analysis in dual distribution decisions also suffers from the inability of courts to analyze the practice of dual distribution separately

from the vertical restraints which are often at issue. Since dual distribution by itself is perfectly legal, its presence theoretically adds nothing to
the analysis and, therefore, should be disregarded. In practice, because

dual distribution superficially resembles a horizontal arrangement, it is
often taken into account in a negative vein. Because some courts view

the presence of dual distribution with skepticism, their perception of the
vertical restraints being challenged is colored. Dual distribution, in other
words, "infects" nonprice restraints in the eyes of many courts.

By contrast, an economic approach views dual distribution as partial vertical integration which firms often employ to reduce costs or in-

crease efficiency. If total vertical integration is not anticompetitive, its
partial form should not be anticompetitive.

71

In the real world, how-

ever, dual distribution is often accompanied by vertical behavior that is
subject to challenge. Under an economic approach such vertical restraints should be analyzed and legally rise or fall on their own. If verti269. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
270. Abadir v. First Miss. Corp., 651 F.2d 422, 427 (5th Cir. 1981).
271. Under certain limited circumstances, dual distribution as well as vertical integration
can be used to facilitate collusion. In such cases, however, the problem is not the presence of
dual distribution or vertical integration, but that of an underlying horizontal conspiracy. Indeed, dual distribution or vertical integration is merely a symptom of the underlying problem.
For discussions that take a more critical view of vertical restraints than this Article, see Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the New Antitrust Policy, 98
HARV. L. REV. 983 (1985); Comanor, Vertical Territorialand Customer Restrictions: White
Motor andits Aftermath, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1419 (1968); Pitofsky, supra note 15; Scherer, The
Economics of Vertical Restraints,52 ANTITRusT L.J. 687 (1983); Steiner, The Nature of Vertical Restraints, 30 ANTrrRusr BULL. 143 (1985); White, Vertical Restraints in Antitrust Law:
A Coherent Model, 26 ANTITRUST BULL. 327 (1981). See also articles cited supra note 8.
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cal restraints were analyzed independently, the current anti-dual

distribution bias would disappear.
The main problem in dual distribution cases centers on the failure of
most courts to engage in any kind of economic analysis. Moreover, when
courts do consider economic factors, their analysis is usually incomplete
or fails to adequately evaluate a challenged practice in terms of its impact
on consumer welfare. Instead of focusing on potential output and efficiency effects, most courts look only to the form of the arrangement or
the source of any restrictions. Their analysis is based solely on the use of
inadequate or incomplete proxies-vertical and horizonta1272-- and proxies of proxies-source of restriction, supplier or distributor-to the ex-

clusion of other relevant economic factors, such as effects on price and
output. 273

The trouble with this approach is that it "involves the com'2 74
mon error of focusing on the label rather than the reason for labeling.
Some progress, however, has been made during the decade following
the Sylvania decision. While no opinion to date fulfills the standard originally called for by Sylvania, the three opinions highlighted in Section VI
come close. The common thread linking Justices Harlan's and Chris272. See, e.g., the FTC's opinion in the Coca-Cola case where the commission defined its
role in the characterization process as that of determining whether the restraints were horizontal or vertical. "Under the court's most recent pronouncement [GTE Sylvania], then, the first
step in evaluating these restraints is to classify them as horizontal or vertical." 91 F.T.C. at
610-11.
It is ironic that an agency with economic expertise would interpret Sylvania's call for an
economic effects test in such a standard, formalistic manner. But that is how most tribunals
continue to handle distributional restraint issues in the aftermath of Sylvania. Perhaps history
would have been changed had the commission instead stated something like this: "Under the
Court's most recent pronouncement, we must first evaluate these restraints on the basis of their
potential effects in economic terms in order to determine whether they should be governed by
the rule of reason or the per se standard." Or the statement could have been worded in terms
of the BroadcastMusic standard or in terms of Professor Liebeler's suggestion, infra note 273.
273. Liebeler argues that courts should focus more directly on economic considerations.
If the Court would clarify the scope of the per se rule and the rule of reason in
horizontal (interbrand) cases, the distinction between vertical and horizontal would
not be nearly so important. The basic question in each case should be whether the
arrangement can contribute to the restriction of output and whether it has an efficiency creating potential.
IntrabrandCartels,supra note 9, at 4 n.12.
274. Baker, supra note 9, at 1510. This problem is not restricted solely to dual distribution.
Unfortunately, antitrust decisions-more so than other legal areas--often tend not to focus on
the real problem. This is especially so where extraneous factors are involved, such as the
presence of dual distribution. Real antitrust problems, according to economic and consumer
welfare theory, are arrangements that lead to output restriction, collusion, or otherwise adversely affect interbrand competition. Alarm bells should not go off simply because an arrangement looks horizontal or because a restriction originated at the dealer level. One cannot
be confident that an arrangement or restriction is per se illegal without first examining its likely
economic effect.
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tian's dissents, with the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co.275 is their reliance on economic factors for
characterizing restraints and their focus on interbrand competition.
Rather than distinguishing between different forms of business arrangements (vertical or horizontal) or the source of restrictions (manufacturer,
distributors or retailers), these opinions focus on whether restrictions
merely affect competition between different resellers of the same brand
(intrabrand) or whether they affect resellers of all brands (interbrand).
The analytical approach in these opinions is basically correct since the
relevant competition under Sylvania is interbrand. Restrictions that directly affect only intrabrand competition, in other words, should be analyzed under the rule of reason no matter what their source. Apparently,
this is the direction the courts are headed when confronted with restrictions imposed by dual distributors. The momentum could be accelerated
if courts would tailor their analyses along the lines suggested in the previous section, or at a minimum, would adopt the criteria the Court set
forth in BroadcastMusic, Inc. v. Columbia BroadcastingSystem, Inc.276
Continued failure to take these minimal steps will mean that manufacturers who use dual distribution arrangements will do so at their peril and
that luck, rather than reason, will continue to determine the legal outcome of challenged arrangements.

275. 664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1982).
276. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).

